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  This research uses the Vietnam War as a case study to elucidate and assess state 
obligations for post-war clean up and reparations for continuing harm against civilians. The 
cessation of hostilities fifty years ago marked the end of the Vietnam War for U.S. and Viet 
Cong troops, but to date the War has yet to end for Vietnamese civilians. Much of the ordnance 
employed by the U.S. military never detonated and remain, to present day, live and buried in and 
on the soil surface typically exploding upon human contact and injuring or killing unsuspecting 
children and adults. Since the U.S. troops departed Vietnam in 1973, at least 100,000 
Vietnamese children and adults have been injured or killed by such explosions. In addition to 
ordnance, the contamination of Agent Orange and other herbicides sprayed during the War in 
concentrations greater than the standard international limit continues to pollute the environment 
and critically impairs human health.  
 
  One focus within this research is the gender-based impacts of war. As the bearers of 
children and as traditional caregivers, particularly in rural villages where much of the War was 
fought, women are particularly affected by the continuing effects of war. This research explores 
how, in the example of Vietnam, women are often at elevated risk of ordnance explosions; why 
they typically experience social and economic isolation as a result of physical and reproductive 
health adversities from the abovementioned violence; and how they are at a particular 
disadvantage when it comes to accessing health and rehabilitation services related to war.  
 
 This research documents in detail the extent as well as the psychosocial and economic 
impacts of the left-behind ordnance and herbicide contamination on civilian populations. It 
covers variables such as the quantities of ordnance and herbicides deployed by the U.S. during 
the War, the number of Vietnamese killed and injured by explosive ordnance since the end of the 
War, the demographics of such victims, the number of civilians exposed to Agent Orange and 
other toxic herbicides, and the inter-generational human health outcomes of exposure to the 
chemicals.  
 
  This work also addresses obligations the U.S. may have under international law to clean 
up its weapons and chemical contamination, as well as to provide reparations for victims. To 
assess state responsibility, the paper presents, examines and analyzes the provisions of four 
relevant international conventions, considering their entry into force and U.S. ratification status, 
whether they cover the weapons used in Vietnam, what cleanup obligations they require of states 
after war, and what reparations obligations the U.S. may be responsible for offering Vietnamese 
civilians. The paper closes with conclusions about the United States’ adherence to international 
law, and it provides recommendations to the United Nations and the international community 








Scofflaw: One who ignores or flouts the law, 
 
especially laws difficult to enforce. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary  
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Right is only a question between equals. The strong do what they can 
and the weak suffer what they must. – Thucydides 
 
This is a story about a war that never should have happened and what happened after it 
ended. It also is a story about the rule of international law and how it is undermined when states 
ignore it.  Perhaps above all, this is a story about a remaining agenda for the world community to 
give international law greater meaning—and meaningful teeth—to help tame an unruly world. 
  I spent the summer of 2016 in Vietnam conducting field research regarding the extent and 
impact of civilian exposure to unexploded ordnance and Agent Orange during and after the 
Vietnam War. Vietnam is a compelling case study, exemplary of the larger issue of state 
responsibility for post-war cleanup and reparations worldwide. My research has entailed the 
compilation of both quantitative and qualitative data, including interviews with U.S. war 
veterans, Vietnamese staff of non-governmental organizations, and review of U.S. and 
Vietnamese government databases, assessing the location and quantity of Agent Orange sprayed, 
and the health implications associated with exposure to live ordnance and toxic herbicides. 
 I also made site visits throughout the country to both Vietnamese and international 
organizations, conducting interviews with staff to learn about the experiences of victims of 
chemicals and bombs, and to learn about the involvement and roles of the U.S. and Vietnamese 
governments in post-war cleanup and reparations. These organizations included the Vietnamese 
Association for Victims of Agent Orange, Vietnamese Women’s Union, Vietnam Veterans for 
Peace, and Project RENEW, the latter two groups having been founded by returning U.S. 
veterans. During my field research I also conducted literature reviews of news stories and journal 
articles pertaining to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, civilian exposure to both unexploded 
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ordnance and Agent Orange, and the gender- and family-based effects of these exposures. I also 
researched United Nations databases regarding international treaties and conventions pertaining 
to state responsibility for the legacy of war.  
  Two individuals proved to be particularly instrumental in my research. One is Chuck 
Searcy, an American Vietnam War veteran and the founder of Project RENEW, a Vietnamese 
organization committed to neutralizing the effects of war. RENEW staff physically (and often 
perilously) remove unexploded ordnance from heavily-bombed provinces, and conducts 
community outreach programs to educate local communities about the existence and dangers of 
unexploded bombs. Searcy, whose work is recognized by the U.S. Congress, was with U.S. 
military intelligence in Saigon during the War, and is now a full-time resident in Vietnam as well 
as a leading expert on the aftermath of the conflict.  
  The other individual is Dr. Jeanne Stellman, Professor Emeritus at Columbia University’s 
Mailman School of Public Health. Stellman specializes in environmental health with particular 
expertise in exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides, including those deployed by the 
U.S. military in Vietnam. In collaboration with her scholar husband, Steven Stellman, she 
obtained U.S. military records to track herbicide exposures in Vietnam, doing so in conjunction 
with the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Institute of Medicine. 
    My hope is that this work will contribute to the field of international human rights law in 
two ways. First, that these findings increase awareness regarding the responsibility states bear for 
human rights violations pertaining to the legacy of war. State accountability for post-war 
responsibility—cleanup, destruction of weapons, and reparations for civilians—is an often 
unexplored and unaddressed topic, certainly among the lay public but also often among 
policymakers and the international community itself. A second contribution hopefully will be 
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greater understanding of the long-term consequences of left-behind weapons on civilian victims, 
and the imperative of responsible parties to adhere to international standards regarding cleanup 
and reparations. In the case of the Vietnam War, as we shall see, this responsibility now largely 
rests with the United States of America.  
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1. WAR WITHOUT END 
 
 
 It is commonly said that war is hell, but only some know the hell that continues long after 
combat ends. 
The perils of military combat have been well-documented, particularly as technological 
and communications advances illuminate experiences on the battlefield to capture the immediate 
impact of conflict on both soldiers and civilian populations. But it is less well known that the 
violence of war typically continues after hostilities cease, with civilian casualties continuing to 
accrue even decades after warring parties depart the scene of battle.  
A key test of the efficacy of international law pertains to state obligations for post-war 
reparations and cleanup of unexploded ordnance (UXO), munitions, and chemical weapons that 
typically continue to maim and kill civilians years after the end of armed conflict. While 
international standards such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols long ago 
established rules governing armed conflict, responsibility for the removal of war remnants and 
redress for innocent civilians are responsibilities often ignored. With unenforced obligations, 
responsibility for the aftermath of war often are left to derive from the good-will of the offending 
state, whether due to altruistic intentions or as an attempt to secure positive world standing. But 
historical experience reveals that neither motivation has proved sufficient to compel warring 
parties to accept international responsibility during and after war. 
  International treaties regarding the legacy of war do exist, but with limited legal muscle 
due to limitations in the ratification, implementation, and enforcement of treaty law. It is not 
uncommon, for example, for states to fail to ratify treaties, or to ratify but fail to implement their 
provisions. This bears relevance particularly to obligations in the aftermath of war, particularly 
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the cleanup and removal of harmful and even lethal weapons left on foreign soil, or reparations 
to innocent civilians injured by those weapons. 
  A key example of the phenomenon of continuing post-war harm is the Vietnam War, the 
term applied to the U.S. presence in Vietnam starting in the early 1960s and lasting until the 
departure of U.S. troops in 1973. During this period the U.S. deforested large swaths of Vietnam 
with highly toxic chemical defoliants and, from 1965- 1973, it also dropped more than five 
million tons of ordnance throughout the country.1 When the United States military left Vietnam 
in 1973, after a decade on the battlefront, it left behind tons of undetonated explosives on 
Vietnamese soil that continue to maim and kill civilians even today. Moreover, residual levels of 
toxic herbicides were left in the environment and their effects still impair the health of civilians, 
including small children and even infants at birth.    
  U.S. engagement in Vietnam presents a poignant case regarding the application of 
international law. Prior to the end of the War fewer treaties addressed post-war cleanup. While 
international standards have developed in the intervening years, compliance with their mandates 
often is ignored. Whether and how international law applies to U.S. responsibility for post-war 
cleanup and reparations in Vietnam is the subject of this work, one providing an insight into the 
even larger issue, namely whether states are free to ignore the status of innocents they harmed, or 




                                                 
1 James P. Harrison, “History’s Heaviest Bombing.” In The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, 
edited by Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 130-139; Michael Clodfelter. 
Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars 1772 – 1991 (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 
Inc., 1995).  
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Timeline of U.S. Role Vietnam  
        Source: Vietnam War Statistics and Facts, 25th Aviation Battalion website; Hatfield Group. 
 
  The first U.S. troops arrived in Vietnam near an airbase in the central coast city Da Nang 
on March 8, 1965, where later forces remained for the better part of a decade. The recipe for the 
perfect storm of events leading to the Vietnam War brewed long before the 1960s, and derived 
from a combination of lingering vulnerabilities and fears stemming from the aftermath of World 
War II, and especially from the Cold War itself. The years following the end of the War 
introduced changes in government leadership and occupation in Vietnam, effectively splitting the 
country in half between forces claiming self-governance and forces siding with colonial powers 
seeking to retain control. 
  After WWII, France reclaimed its colonial toe-hold in Vietnam as the defeated Japanese 
Year Event 
  
1959 First American deaths in Vietnam (2 military advisors) 
1960 United States increases advisors (from 327 to 685) 
1961 First American combat death 
1962 U.S. begins spraying herbicides to defoliate major swaths of South Vietnam 
1963 Vietnamese Buddhist monks self-immolate to protest war 
1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passes Congress, giving President Johnson power to take 
any actions deemed necessary to defend South Vietnam from Viet Cong forces. This 
also was called the Blank Check. 
1965 U.S. combat troops arrive in Vietnam. Extensive carpet bombing campaign known as 
Operation Rolling Thunder is authorized by President Johnson. 
1965 First mass anti-war demonstrations in the United States. 
1968 My Lai Massacre: American soldiers murder hundreds of civilians. 
1969 Peace talks begin in Paris with representatives from the United States, South 
Vietnam and the NLF (Northern Liberation Front). 
1969 President Nixon announces “Vietnamization,” a plan for the U.S. to train South 
Vietnamese troops so they can implement roles that were performed by American 
troops. 
1971 Congress votes to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam by end of the year. 
1973 Mutual exchange of POWs. 
1973 Official end of the U.S. role in Vietnam War (last U.S. soldiers leaves, but military 
advisors and some Marines remain). 
1975 The North Vietnamese take over Saigon, signaling the end of the War. 
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departed. Viet forces soon launched a rebellion against French occupation, and Chinese forces 
supported their struggle by placing soldiers on the border of northern Vietnam. By 1949 the 
struggle had turned into a conventional anti-colonial war.  
  In 1954, the Geneva Accords ended what was then known as the French Indochina War 
by dividing Vietnam along the 17th Parallel, with the North becoming the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and the South the Republic of Vietnam. This division only led to 
further conflict as North and South Vietnam, as they became known, fought for sovereignty. The 
Ho-led forces sought to liberate all of Vietnam from foreign domination, and U.S. forces arrived 
to protect South Vietnam and greater Southeast Asia from what they viewed as a Communist 
takeover of the region. 
  U.S. bombing campaigns in Vietnam began shortly after President Johnson authorized 
“Operation Rolling Thunder” in February, 1965, following the approval of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution.2 The bombing campaign lasted until 1973,3 which marked the departure of the last 
American soldiers from Vietnam and the official end of U.S. role in the War. United States 
military advisors including some Marines would remain in-country for another two years, when 
the 1975 takeover of Saigon by the North Vietnamese signaled the actual end of the long-term 
conflict over regional control.4                 
  In its decade of participation in the War, the U.S. dropped an estimated 7.66 million tons 
of bombs on Indochina5 (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia combined), three times the amount 
                                                 
2 “America Launches Operation Rolling Thunder.” http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/operation-rolling-
thunder. 
3 Kolko. Anatomy of a War, p. 457. 
4 ”Minh Surrenders: Viet Cong in Saigon.” New York Times. April 30, 1975, p.1.  
5 James P. Harrison, “History’s Heaviest Bombing, p. 130-139.” 
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deployed in Europe and the Pacific combined during WWII.6 Of the five million tons dropped on 
Vietnam itself, a notable percentage failed to detonate—estimates put the range at 10% to 
30%7—and they continue to maim and kill civilians currently. Even after years of de-mining 
efforts, “… 350 to 800 thousand tons of bombs and mines remain, including high explosive 
bombs, shrapnel bombs, penetration bombs, missiles, mines, cannon warheads and other 
explosives.”8 The U.S. also planted the soil of Vietnam with landmines and other ordnance, 
many of which never detonated and remain live, often exploding upon human contact. The 
injuries and deaths that continue to occur remain largely unrecognized by the international 
community, now more than forty years after the end of the Vietnam War.9   
  In addition to the unprecedented deployment of ordnance, the U.S. saturated some 4.5 
million acres of the Vietnamese countryside10 with 18 million gallons of toxic herbicides.11 This 
spraying directly exposed an estimated 4.8 million Vietnamese to dioxin, a derivative compound 
in Agent Orange that is regarded as one of the most toxic substances known to science.12 Dioxin 
                                                 
6 Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen, “Making More Enemies Than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped 
on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications,” Japan Focus: The Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no. 17 
(2015), p. 1-3.  
7 Chuck Searcy (founder of Project RENEW) in discussion with the author, July 2016 (citing Department of Defense 
data); Chuck Searcy, “U.S. Veteran Leads Clean-up of Vietnam War’s Lethal Remnants,” PBS Newshour 
(November 20, 2014) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/u-s-veteran-leads-clean-vietnam-wars-lethal-remnants; 
“Cluster Bomb Fact Sheet,” Legacies of War, http://legaciesofwar.org/resources/cluster-bomb-fact-sheet, p. 1. 
8 “Hard to Clear Post-War Bombs and Mines,” Vietnam Government Portal: Online Newspaper of the Government, 
May 14, 2012, accessed June 21, 2016, http://news.chinhphu.vn/Home/Hard-to-clear-postwar-bombs-and-
mines/20125/14389.vgp, p. 1.  
9 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Explosive Remnants of War,” International Committee of the Red 
Cross Resource Center, 2014.  
10 Myra MacPherson, “Voices of Veterans: The Endless Tragedy of Vietnam.” In The People Make the Peace: 
Lessons from the Vietnam Antiwar Movement, edited by Karín Aguilar-San Juan and Frank Joyce (Charlottesville: 
Just World Books, 2015). 
11 Arnold Schecter et al., “Recent Dioxin Contamination from Agent Orange in Residents of a Southern Vietnam 
City,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 43, no. 1 (2001), p. 1; Michael F Martin, “U.S. Agent 
Orange/Dioxin Assistance to Vietnam,” Congressional Research Service, 2015, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44268.pdf, p. 1. 
12 Charles Bailey, “Agent Orange: What Efforts Are Being Made to Address the Continuing Impact of Dioxin in 
Vietnam?” Written testimony prepared for The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the 
Pacific and the Global Environment, Washington, DC, June 2009, p. 7; Annika Johansson and Le Thi Nham Tuyet, 
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adversely impacts individuals in two ways: through direct exposure which produces serious 
transgenerational effects by altering human DNA, and indirect exposure which occurs through 
environmental contamination of crops and seafood.   
  Given the nature of war, there is variation among authoritative sources about the actual 
number of military and civilian deaths. Estimates of total deaths among Vietnamese military, for 
example, range from 666,00013 to 950,765.14 The range of civilian deaths is even wider, 
reflecting U.S. government estimates of 30,00015, scholarly estimates of 405,00016, and even as 
high as 2 million according to other scholars.17 Various authoritative sources put the number of 
American military deaths at a minimum of 58,000.18 
  In a dramatic and intense period during early 1973, largely due to widespread anti- 
war sentiment on the part of the American public, the United States government decided to exit 
Vietnam quickly. It removed all of its combat forces, all of its diplomatic representation, and 
many of its South Vietnamese allies. But the U.S. removed none of the deadly munitions it had 
dropped. Its unexploded bombs were left behind as was the lethal residue of herbicides in the 
Vietnamese soil and waterways.  
                                                 
“Impact of Chemical Warfare with Agent Orange on Women’s Reproductive Lives in Vietnam: A Pilot Study,” 
Reproductive Health Matters 9 no. 18 (2001), p. 156. 
13 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 453. 
14 This figure is the official U.S. Defense Department estimate, as quoted in Charles Hirschman et al., "Vietnamese 
Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate,” Population and Development Review 21 no. 4 (1995), p. 
790. 
15 The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 5th edition. Edited by Dr. Spencer 
Tucker, and Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011), p. 176. 
16 Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 453. 
17 The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 5th edition, p. 176. 
18 National Archives, Military Records: Statistical Information About Fatal Casualties of the Vietnam War, accessed 




   The remaining ordnance and herbicides have maimed and killed civilians throughout the 
decades following America’s departure, and continue to do so today.19 Children playing in fields 
find baseball-size pieces of metal which, unbeknownst to them, are cluster bombs. They toss the 
“baseballs” to one another in spontaneous games of catch until they explode, blowing off arms or 
legs and even killing children at play.20  
  An important and often-overlooked component of war, in this case of the Vietnam War, 
is its gender-based impacts. There are notable differences in the way men and women experience 
war, as well as how they experience the continuing economic, social, and emotional damage of 
its aftermath. While civilian populations routinely suffer the effects of armed conflict in their 
countries, the impact is often experienced differently. Differences in the division of agricultural 
labor between men and women influence their vulnerability to landmines and put them at 
differential risks of being maimed or killed by UXO while farming.21 Similarly, differences in 
community responses to male and female victims of UXO often isolate women and jeopardize 
their marriage prospects. The United Nations Mine Action Service notes that after UXO 
explosions in agrarian societies, such as those in central Vietnam, “women are perceived as 
‘damaged’ and no longer productive members of society or desirable as a wife, because they can 
no longer work in the fields.”22 Women also experience greater difficulty accessing health and 
rehabilitation services than men. “Women and children are often the most exposed to landmines, 
                                                 
19 Judy Gumbo, “Viet Nam Time Travel, 1970 - 2013.” In The People Make the Peace: Lessons from the Vietnam 
Antiwar Movement, edited by Karín Aguilar-San Juan and Frank Joyce (Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2015), 
Chapter 2; Andrew Wells-Dang, “A Regional Approach: Mine and UXO Risk Reduction in Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia,” Journal of Mine Action no. 9.2 (2013), accessed July 7, 2016, 
http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/9.2/focus/wells-dang/wells-dang.shtml, p. 1.   
20 Judy Gumbo, “Viet Nam Time Travel,” Chapter 2; Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu (Project RENEW 
staff) in discussion with the author, July 2016.  
21 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Conflict, Peace-Building, Disarmament, Security: 
Gender Perspectives on Landmines,” United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, 2001, p. 1.  
22 United Nations Development Fund for Women, Women, War, Peace and Landmines, 2004.  
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especially if they are primarily responsible for gathering fuel or water… [and]… women are 
much less likely than children and men to have access both to treatment and to rehabilitation and 
prostheses.”23  
  The long-term impact of exposure to Agent Orange also falls disproportionately on 
women. Men and women who were exposed to dioxin directly, or whose parents or grandparents 
were exposed, experience changes to their DNA and often produce children with severe 
deformities, reflecting genetic impairments which can continue through several generations.24  
  While both men and women suffer significant adverse health outcomes from exposure to 
dioxin, women often experience additional burdens such as elevated rates of infertility and 
miscarriages. For those who do carry babies to term, their children often are born prematurely, 
and with profound congenital malformations.25 Parenting children with permanent physical or 
mental disabilities can have serious economic and social consequences for families, particularly 
for women as mothers and primary caregivers, perhaps even preventing them from working and 
contributing to family income.26  
 Ultimately, however, the cost of war is not to be measured in terms of women or men, 
adults or children, soldiers or civilians, but by its impact on human lives, the pains of the 
wounded and permanently impaired, the deaths of its victims, and the broken lives of those 
scorched forever by its impact. 
                                                 
23 United Nations Development Fund for Women, Women, War, Peace and Landmines.  
24 Mohan Manikkam et al., “Dioxin (TCDD) Induces Epigenetic Transgenerational Inheritance of Adult Onset 
Disease and Sperm Epimutations,” PLoS ONE 7(9), p. 1, 5, 11; Arnold Schecter et al., “Recent Dioxin 
Contamination;” p. 442. 
25 Johansson and Le, “Impact of Chemical Warfare,” p. 157. 
26 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Conflict, Peace-Building, Disarmament, Security: 
Gender Perspectives on Landmines,” United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs; Program staff (Vietnam 
Women’s Union) in discussion with the author, July 2016. 
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2.  FIFTY YEARS OF BOMBS 
 
 
Substantial political resolve and no shortage of bravado led the United States to unleash a 
greater array of military might on Vietnam than the world had ever seen before. Perhaps nothing 
epitomizes U.S. intentions at the time more than the now-infamous 1968 statement of Air Force 
Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay: “We’re going to bomb them back into the Stone Age.”1 
The 7.66 million tons of ordnance the U.S. dropped throughout the narrow, serpent-
shaped nation included a potpourri of explosives such as cluster bombs, missiles, grenades, 
landmines and more. While the term ordnance refers to all types of military equipment, ranging 
from explosive devices to trucks and airplanes, the term has come to be used primarily with 
respect to explosive devices. This latter definition will be used herein, at times abbreviated as 
UXO when referring to unexploded ordnance. (The following table lists the military terms used 
for this range of military devices). 
Of the array of ordnance deployed in Vietnam, a significant percentage did not detonate 
as intended, and has remained live and deadly for more than forty years. Typically they are 
submerged in family rice fields and backyard gardens, or scattered in forests, bamboo groves and 
other areas near children’s footpaths to school.2  
Sprinkled throughout the country these life-threatening devices, when exposed, often are 
assumed to be rocks—“rocks” that explode upon contact with farmers in their fields or children 
in family gardens.3 Cluster bombs—“the demon seed of modern munitions” 4—comprise a  
                                                 
1 Ross Wilson, The Language of the Past (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Place, 2016), p. 61. 
2 Interview with Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu (Project RENEW staff) in discussion with the author, June 
27, 2016. 
3 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016; Wyatt Olson, “A New Approach to Ridding Vietnam of 
Unexploded Ordnance,” Stars and Stripes, accessed June 27, 2016, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/a-new-
approach-to-ridding-vietnam-of-unexploded-ordnance-1.176497#.WOPixqK1tPZ, p. 2. 




significant proportion of the UXO remaining in Vietnam.5 Their prevalence, as well as their size 
and mechanism of operation, make them, along with unexploded grenades, the leading cause of 
UXO-related injuries and deaths since the end of the War.6   
 
   
   
                                                 
5 Doug Hostetter, “A Pacifist in the War Zone.” In The People Make the Peace: Lessons from the Vietnam Antiwar 
Movement, edited by Karín Aguilar-San Juan and Frank Joyce (Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2015), p. 107 - 
120; Olson, “A New Approach”, p. 2; Interview with Chuck Searcy (founder of Project RENEW) in discussion with 
the author, June 28, 2016.  
6 Jonathon Guthrie and Portia Stratton, “The Quang Tri Integrated Survey and Clearance Project,” The Journal of 
ERW and Mine Action, 19.1, April 2015, p. 16.  































All types of military supplies, ranging from weapons and explosives to vehicles, aircraft and 
artillery. 
 
General term for ammunition and armaments (explosive, chemical, nuclear). 
 
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to all undetonated explosive weapons (bombs, shells, 
grenades, mines, cluster bombs), while explosive remnants of war (ERW) includes those 
detonated as well. 
 
Air-dropped or ground-launched explosive weapons that release “sub-munitions” or 
“bomblets” designed to kill human targets or destroy vehicles and equipment. 
 
Explosive devises concealed under- or above-ground to disable or destroy human and other 
targets when triggered by pressure or a trip wire. 
 
Small bomb thrown by hand of three major types: fragmentation (lethal fragments), 
concussion (explosive power) and anti-tank. 
 
A self-propelled precision-guided munition (ballistic, cruise or surface-to-air). 
 




Sources: These terms have been selected because of their relevance to the Vietnam War, and 
defined by the author based on military records and common usage from a variety of 
sources.   
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  Since the final departure of the U.S. from Vietnam in 1975, more than 100,000 
Vietnamese civilians have been injured (60,000) or killed (42,000) by UXO explosions.7 Some 
reports place these figures even higher, including the Vietnam Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and 
Social Affairs which lists UXO-related injuries alone at 66,000.8 As for deaths attributed to 
UXO, the numbers can be staggering: The number of Vietnamese who have died in UXO-related 
explosions since the U.S. departure, more than 42,000, is comparable to killing every baseball 
fan in the 37,949-seat stadium at Boston’s Fenway Park. And even today, the number of injuries 
and deaths continue to mount.  
When expanded from Vietnam to include Laos and Cambodia, which the U.S. bombed 
heavily as well, thousands more have been injured or killed.9 Not surprisingly, they are 
ubiquitous in nature: In central Vietnam alone live ordnance exist on or beneath some 35% of the 
land, covering some 16 million acres.10  
Altogether, so prevalent is the presence of UXO in Indochina that at the current rate of 
cleanup it would take three centuries to clear the land of explosives.11 Various military terms, 
some synonymous and overlapping, are used to describe the types of ordnance. The term 
“explosive remnants of war” (ERW) is an umbrella term that encompasses all types of explosive 
ordnance from war—artillery shells, grenades, mortar shells, rockets, and missiles—regardless of 
                                                 
7 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016; Hostetter, The People Make the Peace, p. 107 - 120; The 
Associated Press, “Vietnam: More than 100,000 Casualties From Explosives Since War Ended,” New York Times, 
December 7, 2011.  
8 Olson, “A New Approach.” 
9 Andrew Wells-Dang, “A Regional Approach: Mine and UXO Risk Reduction in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,” 
Journal of Mine Action No. 9.2 (2013), accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/9.2/focus/wells-
dang/wells-dang.shtml, p. 3.   
10 Chloe Cunningham, “U.S. and Vietnam Sign Memorandum of Understanding,” The Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action, 18.1, Spring 2014, p. 1. 
11 “Deputy Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh Talks About VN-US Defense Ties,” Vietnam Net Bridge, March 3, 
2015, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/special-reports/126759/deputy-defense-minister-nguyen-chi-vinh-talks-
about-vn-us-defense-ties.html, p. 4; Olson, “A New Approach.”, p. 1. 
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whether or not they detonated.12 Unexploded ordnance (UXO) are a subset of ERW that 
embodies the same types of ordnance, the difference being that UXO refers to ordnance that 
were “launched, dropped, or otherwise used but have not exploded as intended.”13 Of the 
combined ERW used by the U.S., the predominant share consists of “explosive remnants,” 
cluster bombs, grenades, missiles, shells, rockets.14  
Cluster bombs themselves contain hundreds of small bomblets the size of baseballs, and 
were released by aircraft or deployed on the ground via rocket launchers, artillery, and combat 
vehicles.15 During the War, cluster bombs typically were deployed by the Air Force on fixed-
flight paths, often as a means of clearing space for the spraying of Agent Orange. Because of the 
manner in which they were dropped, “unexploded [cluster] bombs tend to be found in groups; if 
you find one, you’re likely to find more.”16 Each of the hundreds of bomblets within each cluster 
bomb is small, containing within it thousands of sharp pieces of shrapnel. Each cluster bomb is 
designed to explode several feet from the ground, dispersing its bomblets and razor-sharp 
shrapnel over several square meters to maximize its destructive impact on humans.17  
   The release of cluster bombs from an aircraft is triggered by the spinning of a dispenser 
which determines the pattern by which the bombs fall, as well as their orientation to the ground. 
The bombs fall at the rate of 125 feet per second, exploding close to the ground with the intensity 
of a pistol bullet and capable of maiming or killing anyone within its radius.18 “Unlike 
landmines, which are designed to maim more than to kill, cluster bombs are much more likely to 
                                                 
12 “Explosive Remnants of War,” International Committee of the Red Cross Resource Center, p. 1. 
13 Ibid, p.1.  
14 Wells-Dang, “A Regional Approach”, p. 1. 
15 “Cluster Bombs”, Handicap International United Kingdom, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.handicap-
international.us/cluster_bombs, p. 1. 
16 George Black, “The Vietnam War is Still Killing People,” The New Yorker, May 20, 2016, p. 3. 
17 “Cluster Bombs”, Handicap International, p. 1; George Black, “The Vietnam War is Still Killing People”, p. 3. 
18 “Cluster Bombs,” Handicap International, p. 2.  
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kill and to cause multiple casualties.”19 But a significant percentage of these ordnance did not 
detonate as planned, remaining live and lethal after having penetrated the soil and waterways 
where they remain today.20  
           For the victims of UXO explosions who do not die on the spot, the impact typically is 
long-lasting and often permanent. Being maimed by UXO not only alters the physical 
appearance of a child or adult, but often destroys limbs and tears apart the fabric of families and 
even communities. The physical pain of an injury, the subsequent loss of work and related 
economic ramifications, challenges in accessing medical and rehabilitation services, and 
prolonged emotional trauma, together, produce long-lasting changes in the lives of survivors and 
families.  
  The physical impacts from UXO explosions include “fragmentation wounds, burns, 
punctured eardrums, loss of sight, and amputation of limb(s).”21 For many, these physical 
wounds are exacerbated by future repercussions. Adults and children whose limbs were blown 
off during the explosion, for instance, experience a series of additional burdens including the 
fitting of artificial limbs, health and rehabilitation services, and replacement of prosthetic limbs 
every set number of years.22 
  As is common for survivors of trauma, UXO victims typically suffer tremendous 
psychological stress as well. Many experience shame, depression, and even ostracism resulting 
from the gravity of the injury itself. Whereas health services and counseling are usually made 
available to trauma victims, such services often are inaccessible to many Vietnamese survivors 
                                                 
19 “Cluster Bombs,” Handicap International, p. 2.  
20 Chuck Searcy, “US Veteran Leads Clean-Up of Vietnam War’s Lethal Remnants,” PBS Newshour (November 20, 
2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/u-s-veteran-leads-clean-vietnam-wars-lethal-remnants/.  
21 “Explosive Remnants of War,” International Committee of the Red Cross Resource Center, 
https://shop.icrc.org/les-restes-explosifs-de-guerre.html?___store=default, p. 4. 
22 Ibid, p. 4.  
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due to their remote location.23 
  The psychological well-being of victims may be further compounded by sudden changes 
in employment and financial status. Victims suffer economic disabilities as sustained injury and 
sudden loss of hands, fingers or limbs may lead to diminished work ability or even no 
employment at all. Among those disproportionately impacted by UXO explosions are 
subsistence farmers. In addition to the many other complications that victims experience, these 
farmers are subjected to additional challenges due to their vulnerable financial status. Moreover, 
loss of individual and family income makes short- and long-term medical care (surgeries, 
prosthetic limbs, counselling) challenging for many, but for those living in abject poverty, 
medical and psychological assistance may be well beyond their means.24  
  Even the most basic means of survival may become life-threatening, especially for 
subsistence farmers. Living and working land ridden with UXO substantially compromises the 
nature of their work, such that “growing crops, transporting goods, and foraging…all [become] 
risky activities under the circumstances.”25 Left with no alternative, farmers often remain trapped 
in a Catch-22 in which, dangerous as it may be, “necessity drives [them] to till farmland, despite 
knowing that they might detonate unseen munitions.”26  With no alternative means of income, 
subsistence farmers not surprisingly constitute the majority of UXO victims. 
  The areas of Vietnam most acutely affected by the prevalence of UXO are the South-
central Coast and the Central Highlands.27 Nestled in central Vietnam just south of the 
demilitarized zone that divided North and South Vietnam during the War, and 115 miles north of 
                                                 
23 Ibid, p. 4. 
24 Ibid, p. 5. 
25 Ibid, p. 6. 
26 Ibid, p. 6. 
27 Wells-Dang, “A Regional Approach”, p. 3. 
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China Beach where U.S. troops first set foot in the country on March 8, 1965, sits Quang Tri 
province. About 60% of combat fighting occurred in Quang Tri28, rendering it the most heavily-
bombed province and now the one with the highest levels of UXO in the country.29  
   The UXO infestation in Quang Tri presents unique challenges, setting it apart from the 
rest of the country and contributing to the increased vulnerability of its families. Because the 
province is largely agricultural with most of its people relying on subsistence farming, families 
are especially susceptible to UXO explosions. With endemic poverty and a hand-to-mouth 
lifestyle throughout much of the province, workers often depend upon unreliable means of 
earning money such as scrap metal collection.30 But with Quang Tri being the most heavily-
bombed province in the country, much of the sought-after scrap metal is from UXO. “With no 
other employment options, adult males living in contaminated areas search for UXO to remove 
from the ground and sell to local dealers. In some cases children are also involved.”31 Indeed, of 
the thousands of UXO-related deaths in Quang Tri since the end of the War, nearly one-third of 
the victims have been children.32  
  Hundreds of thousands of tons of ordnance were dropped in Quang Tri, alone, and an 
estimated 83% of the land today remains ridden with UXO.33 Both during and after the War, 
unexploded ordnance have impacted local families and communities in enduring ways. Since the 
end of the War there have been at least 8,000 serious UXO injuries and deaths within the 
                                                 
28 Wendy Waldeck and Sarah Sensamaust, “Vietnam,” Journal of Mine Action, No. 9.2 (2006), 
http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/9.2/profiles/vietnam/vietnam.shtml, p. 1.  
29 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016.  
30 Interactions with a Violent Past: Reading Post-Conflict Landscapes in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, edited by 
Vatthana Pholsena. and Oliver Tappe (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013), p. 55. 
31 Wells-Dang, “A Regional Approach”, p. 2.  
32 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016; Olson, “A New Approach”, p. 3. 
33 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016.  
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province.34 The majority of UXO accidents in Quang Tri have occurred in residential areas 
(25%), in rural areas (21.84%), in rice fields (11.78%), and in forests (10.78%). Within these 
locations, cluster bombs are the leading single cause of accidents. The majority of victims of 
UXO accidents are youth and adults ages sixteen to thirty-five (44.11%), followed by children 
ages one to fifteen (27.01%), and adults ages thirty-six to fifty-five (25%).35 
Over the last sixteen years UXO accidents and casualties in Quang Tri have noticeably 
declined, reflecting progress largely attributable to the clearance and risk education work of 
Project RENEW (established by American veteran Chuck Searcy), and its partner teams that 
remove individual ordnance and conduct local mine risk campaigns about the danger posed by 
UXO. But because of the large number of ordnance still in the ground, Quang Tri remains at 
greater risk than many other Vietnamese provinces, standing as a glaring microcosm of the harm 
that has continued since the U.S. departure. 
  The U.S. military’s extensive seeding of the country with lethal devices largely ended on 
March 29, 1973, when U.S. combat troops left Vietnam and the War was declared over insofar as 
American troops were concerned. (The War, itself, would continue for an additional two years 
while U.S. military advisors remained in country, although U.S. combat forces had departed).  
  In the immediate years following the U.S. departure from Vietnam, the health and well-
being of American veterans was tenuous at best, as their return home brought with it many 
permanent physical and mental wounds. Soldiers often experienced survivor’s guilt, recurring 
nightmares and other forms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), with a significant number 
committing suicide. With many American families attempting to navigate through these 
                                                 
34 Quang Tri Province Legacy of War Coordination Center website, accessed June 14, 2016, http://lwcc-dbu-
quangtri.vn/en-us/FACTS-AND-FIGURES/By-Province/Quang-Tri-Province, p. 1.   
35 “Explosive Remnants of War Accidents and Casualties in Quang Tri from 2000-2016,” Project RENEW website, 
accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.landmines.org.vn.  
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challenges the continuing impact of UXO on Vietnamese families and children was hardly on the 
radar in the United States. Moreover, attitudes in the U.S. remained quite antagonistic to all 
things Vietnamese, as did the stance of the American government. 
  For nearly two decades after the departure from Vietnam, U.S. policymakers remained 
silent about the magnitude of harmful weapons they had left behind. Officials did not 
acknowledge the gravity of the problem or the fact that American weapons were continuing to 
maim and kill innocent civilians, nor did they evince responsibility for intervention and offer 
assistance to stop what amounted to a continuing war long after formal hostilities had ended.36  
  It was not until the mid-1990s that the legacy of the Vietnam War and the ongoing harm 
to Vietnamese people would be publicly addressed, albeit in quite small and largely halting 
ways. Even then, initial steps were taken not by the U.S. government but by private 
organizations, often headed by GIs who had fought in the War. A first step was taken by Peace 
Trees, a non-governmental organization that came to plant trees in the country with the intention 
of repairing and strengthening relations between Vietnam and the United States. Over time, the 
presence of Peace Trees helped to expose the existence of UXO and the enormity of the problem, 
with the organization determining that its work should include the removal of unexploded 
ordnance, which interfered with the safe planting of trees. The presence of Peace Trees in 
Vietnam would bring about a change in the discourse and treatment of the legacy of the War, 
establishing the imperative not only to acknowledge the existence of all the left-behind killing 
devices, but also calling for their removal. With growing knowledge of the UXO threat, as well 
as the magnitude of the problem, impetus developed to pressure the U.S. government into 
                                                 
36  Searcy, 2016. 
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removing ordnance from several acres of land, an act which signified the first U.S. 
acknowledgment of the problem it had created and then ignored for decades.37  
  This pivotal period ultimately served as a catalyst to generate international interest and 
mobilization regarding the issue of UXO and possible solutions. International attention in turn 
began to pressure the United States to give even more consideration to the impact of its 
remaining war weapons, and also to start acknowledging the enormity of the “continuing war” 
that remained beneath the waters and soil of Vietnam.  
  From that point forward, at least some responsibility regarding UXO cleanup in Vietnam 
was a principle that remained on the American national policy table. The connection between 
U.S. ordnance and ongoing Vietnamese injuries and deaths had been established and U.S. 
culpability affixed, at least sufficiently so to break through the political and policy resistance of 
prior decades.38  
  The previously unthinkable was to take place as the U.S. State Department would begin 
to support at least some UXO clearance efforts.39 The beginning of direct U.S. involvement 
began with the State Department’s Humanitarian Office, with over $200,000 given towards the 
launch of a UXO risk-safety program in conjunction with Peace Trees.40 The State Department 
later donated $3.3 million to Project RENEW through Norwegian People’s Aid and, more 
recently, allocated more than $50 million toward expanding UXO cleanup in and around Quang 
Tri province.41  
                                                 
37 Searcy, 2016. 
38 Searcy, 2016.  
39 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016.  
40 Searcy, 2016. 
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According to U.S. veteran Chuck Searcy, now a resident of Vietnam and a major player 
in bringing matters to the attention of U.S. officials, “This was the start of an approach to an end-
game, that is to say real closure and with an effort to assist Vietnam to develop the capacity to 
manage [the UXO] problem for future years. Within the next decade, the U.S. should be able to 
step back and say ‘we finally assisted the Vietnamese and began to do what we should have done 
40 years ago’.”42  
Yet despite such optimism, U.S. contributions remain exceptionally modest when 
compared to the need in Vietnam and to the capacity of the U.S. to engage in more serious 
cleanup and remediation. In 2012, for example, the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister, Nguyen 
Thien Nhan, predicted that UXO clearance in Vietnam would require $10 billion and another 
hundred years to accomplish at the current rate of progress. Others have estimated triple that 
amount of time for complete removal.43 In order to make a substantial impact, the U.S. State 
Department would in all likelihood need to make far more substantial contributions.   
Future progress may depend on Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, who has been 
effective in encouraging Congress to allocate money to the State Department in support of UXO 
clearance. In addition to Senator Leahy, Senators McCain, Webb, Harkin, and former-Senator 
John Kerry have also demonstrated support to varying degrees, although Leahy has by far been 
the most instrumental.44  
  In addition to allocated State Department funds for UXO clearance, the U.S. has also 
contributed to clearance in a handful of other ways such as capacity-building with the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Defense. The State Department also funds Golden West Humanitarian 
                                                 
42 Searcy, 2016. 
43 Olson, “A New Approach”, p. 4. 
44 Searcy, 2016. 
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Foundation programs in mine-impacted countries, and contributes to general development work 
throughout Vietnam.45  
 Meanwhile, the years of silence on the part of the United States had left the Vietnamese 
government little choice but to take whatever remediation action it could afford. Searcy notes 
that the Vietnamese government “put a lot of money into their own budget [for clearance], but 
we don’t know much about what they do.”46 In Quang Tri, for example, an initial response and 
rehabilitation system is now in place for victims of UXO, although the situation in other 
provinces remains somewhat less clear.  
Above all, Project RENEW has played the key role in UXO clearance in the countryside. 
Committed to “restoring the environment and neutralizing the effects of war”, Project RENEW is 
located in Quang Tri province and operates three programs: the physical removal of UXO; 
community education regarding the identification and dangers of unexploded ordnance; and a 
victim assistance program providing prostheses and rehabilitation for victims of UXO 
explosions. The majority of RENEW’s revenue comes from a mix of U.S. and other international 
donors such as Norwegian’s People’s Aid (their primary partner), and the Vietnamese through 
the Department of Science and Technology; Department of Health; Department of Foreign 
Affairs; Provincial Military Headquarters; and Office of Province People’s Committee. 
Project RENEW’s removal team follows the procedures of international humanitarian 
groups to help ensure safety, and within the last nine years has removed 30,538 UXO from 
gardens, rice fields, plantations, and roadsides in Quang Tri.47 Within the past year alone, 
RENEW received more than 600 calls from local families reporting discoveries of ordnance.48   
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As shown in the following graph, there was a measurable increase over recent years in 
the number of UXO discovered and reported by local people to Project RENEW’s teams for 
timely and safe removal. 
 
UXO Activity in Vietnam Over a Five Year Period 
Red = UXOs discovered    Blue = UXOs destroyed 
 
                 Source: Project RENEW 
 
Project RENEW’s victim assistance staff works closely with hospital and health care 
providers regarding incidence and outcomes of victims of UXO explosions. All amputees fitted 
for prostheses also receive training by health care professionals about the use and care of 
artificial limbs, as well as regular checkups and counseling regarding the need for replacement of 
the prostheses. RENEW is one of the key organizations in Vietnam committed to UXO clearance 
and victim assistance and, since 2008, its staff have fit 1,100 people with prostheses, with nearly 
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that many more remaining on the wait list.49  
 
* *         * 
 
For a wealthy superpower, as well as the major protagonist leaving behind weapons of 
destruction that harm Vietnamese civilians to this day, the U.S. government arguably has done 
little regarding the ongoing damage inflicted by its unexploded ordnance. Children are still being 
maimed by cluster bombs, their parents are still dying from grenades and mines, and full removal 
of remaining live ordnance from Vietnam, at the rate of success over the past two decades, 
reportedly will take hundreds more years.   
But explosive ordnance are not the only threat the U.S. left behind. Significant issues 
remain today regarding ground and water contamination in Vietnam, the result of widespread 
chemical defoliation by the U.S. Air Force during the War, a topic to which we now turn.  
 
                                                 
49 Ngo Xuan Hien and Nguyen Thanh Phu, 2016.  
26 
 
3.  HERBICIDE COCKTAILS, CANCERS, AND BIRTH DEFECTS 
 
 From 1962 until 1972, the U.S. Air Force planes sprayed millions of gallons of herbicides 
throughout Vietnam1 with the dual purpose of “destroying crops that might feed the Viet Cong, 
and removing forest cover to make their presence more visible to spotter planes and airstrikes.”2 
Of the total gallons sprayed, nearly two-thirds were Agent Orange3, named for the color bands of 
its storage barrels.4 While estimates of herbicide use vary, scientists at Columbia University, led 
by Dr. Jeanne Steelman, placed the actual volume sprayed at more than 20 million gallons.5  
  The spraying targeted three primary areas of Vietnam: southern regions near the Bien 
Hoa and Phu Cat air bases; central provinces near the Da Nang air base; and along the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail, an area used by the Viet Cong to transport troops and supplies to the South. The 
defoliants blanketed a substantial portion of the land in southern Vietnam, and as much as 34% 
of the targeted areas were sprayed more than once, some of them many times.6  
  The Air Force conducted the spraying in so-called “missions” under the code name 
Operation Ranch Hand, carrying out a total of 20,000 missions often timed with the harvest 
cycle.7 While Agent Orange was sprayed in about two-thirds of the Ranch Hand missions, it was 
only one of a rainbow spectrum of poisonous herbicides used. Agent White was the second most-
used defoliant, followed by Agent Blue which was used primarily for vegetation destruction (as 
opposed to trees). In smaller quantities Agents Pink, Green, and Purple were also used, 
                                                 
1 Schecter, “Recent Dioxin Contamination from Agent,” p. 435- 443; Jeanne Stellman, “The Extent and Patterns of 
Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam,” Nature 422 (2003), p. 681.   
2 George Black, “The Lethal Legacy of the Vietnam War,” The Nation, March 16, 2015, p. 22-23.  
3 “Spillover,” Agent Orange Record, accessed June 22, 2016, 
http://www.agentorangerecord.com/impact_on_vietnam/environment/hot_spots, p. 1. 
4Stellman, “The Extent and Patterns,” p. 681; Black, “The Lethal Legacy,” p. 23.  
5 Stellman, “The Extent and Patterns,” p. 682.  
6 “The Invisible Enemy,” Agent Orange Record, accessed July 1, 2016, 
http://www.agentorangerecord.com/agent_orange_history/in_vietnam, p.1. 
7 Stellman (quoted in George Black, “The Lethal Legacy,” p. 22.  
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particularly during the early years of the War.8 Collectively, these defoliants were sprayed in 
quantities up to 50 times the concentrations recommended by their manufacturers.9  
The spraying missions were ubiquitous, 
often executed at frequencies within days of 
each other, exposing Vietnamese soldiers and 
civilians alike to the toxic chemicals. Over the 
decade 3,181 villages were sprayed with the 
defoliants,10 exposing some 4.8 million men, 
women, and children to their harmful effects.11 
Stellman’s research team found that one 
million Viet Cong soldiers were exposed,12 in 
addition to many more Vietnamese civilians. 
Moreover, an estimated 2.8 million American 
troops on the ground were exposed to the 
chemicals as well, an outcome whose import 
and far-reaching consequences would not begin to be understood until decades after the War 
                                                 
8 Stellman, “The Extent and Patterns,” p. 681.; Hatfield Consultants, Ltd, “Preliminary Assessment of 
Environmental Impacts Related to Spraying of Agent Orange Herbicide During the Viet Nam War,” 1998, accessed 
July 11, 2016, http://www.hatfieldgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/AgentOrangeReports/CIDA614/default.htm, p. 
36-38; John Stapleton, Agent Orange: The Cleanup Begins, (Sydney: A Sense of Place Publishing, Inc, 2013), p.6-7.  
9 “Promoting Hope and Dignity: A Long-Term Humanitarian Response to Agent Orange and Dioxin in Vietnam,” 
The Aspen Institute, accessed July 11, 2016, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/agent-orange-in-vietnam-
program/promoting-hope-dignity-long-term-humanitarian-response-agent-orange-dioxin-vietnam, p. 2; Stapleton, 
Agent Orange: The Cleanup Begins, p. 7.  
10 “What is Agent Orange?” The Aspen Institute, accessed July 7, 2016, 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/agent-orange-in-vietnam-program/what-is-agent-orange, p.4; The War 
Remnants Museum, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, 2016.  
11 “Agent Orange,” The American Public Health Association, accessed July 7, 2016, https://www.apha.org/policies-
and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2014/07/29/13/22/agent-orange, p. 1; Program staff 
(Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent Orange) in discussion with the author, July 2016.   
12 “Eating, Drinking, Touching, Breathing, Nursing, Conceiving,” The Agent Orange Record, accessed June 10, 
2016, http://www.agentorangerecord.com/impact_on_vietnam/health, p. 4. 
Source: United States Department of the Army 





    Spraying of Agent Orange, Operation Ranch Hand Mission 
 
                                             Source: Chau, Beyond the Lines 
 
   The spraying missions cast a wide shadow of destruction. But unlike the deployment of 
ordnance whose threats are announced by loud explosions, the approaching peril of defoliants is 
more silent, their unseen toxins penetrating the environment and food chain for years.13   
The most pernicious of the silent killers was dioxin, also known by the chemical name 
TCDD (tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin). TCDD is a derivative compound of Agent Orange, 
classified as one of the most toxic substances known to science.14 Dioxin is part of a family of 
seventy-five chemicals, of which TCDD is the most toxic,15 and is produced as a by-product 
                                                 
13 “Dioxins and Their Effects on Human Health,” World Health Organization, accessed July 8, 2016, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs225/en, Section: “Key Facts.” 
14 Doug Hostetter, “A Pacifist in the War Zone.” In The People Make the Peace: Lessons from the Vietnam Antiwar 
Movement, edited by Karín Aguilar-San Juan and Frank Joyce (Charlottesville, Just World Books: 2015); Johansson 
and Le, “Impact of Chemical Warfare,” p. 156. 
15Schecter, “Recent Dioxin Contamination,” p. 435; “Dioxins and Their Effects on Human Health,” World Health 
Organization, Section: “Background;” “Dioxins,” The National Institute of Environmental Health Science, accessed 
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during combustion or during the manufacture of chlorinated chemicals.16 According to the World 
Health Organization, the standard safe limit of dioxin in the blood is .07 parts per trillion (ppt), 
and the environmental limit in many countries typically is 1,000 ppt in soil and 100 ppt in 
sediment.17 As we will see, these standards were to be ignored many times over by the U.S. 
military.   
  The ubiquitous use of this toxic agent in Vietnam was compounded by its persistent 
shelf-life. Dioxin is slow to degrade in the environment, and in surface soil it can take decades to 
break down to its half-life (half the original concentration). “Sun will break down dioxin, so on 
leaf and soil surfaces it will last one to three years, depending on conditions, [whereas] dioxin 
buried or leached under the surface or deep in the sediment of rivers and other bodies of water 









                                                 
16 “All You Ever Wanted to Know About Dioxin or Perhaps You Really Do Not Want to Know,” Agent Orange 
Association of Canada, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.agentorangecanada.com/dioxin.php, p. 1. 
17 “Health Effects,” The Aspen Institute, accessed June 10, 2016, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/agent-
orange-in-vietnam-program/health-effects, p. 4; Charles Bailey and Susan Hammond, “Frequently Asked Questions 
About Agent Orange/Dioxin,” War Legacies Project and Ford Foundation, accessed, June 9, 2016, 
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Conversion of Standard to Metric Measurements 
 
Standard Metric 
1 gallon 3.79 liters 
1 quart 0.95 liters 
1 pint 0.47 liters 
1 pound (lb.) 0.45 kilograms 
1 ounce (oz.) 28.35 grams 
1 ounce (oz.) 28,349.5 milligrams (one-thousandth of a gram) 
1 ounce (oz.) 28,349,500 micrograms (one-millionth of a gram) 
0.26 gallons 1 liter 
1.056 quarts 1 liter 
2.11 pints 1 liter 
2.2 pounds (lb.) 1 kilogram 
35.274 ounces (oz.) 1 kilogram 
0.035 ounces (oz.) 1 gram 
0.00003527396 ounces (oz.) 1 milligram (one-thousandth of a gram) 






PPT (Parts per Trillion)  PPT analogies 
1 nanogram/kilogram (ng/kg) = 1 ppt 
1 nanogram/liter (ng/1) = 1 ppt 
1 picogram/gram (pg/g) = 1 ppt 
1 square inch in 250 square miles 
1 second in nearly 32,000 years 
1 ounce in 7.5 billion gallons of water 
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  Even in rivers and lakes dioxin is persistent. It accumulates in sediment and, because it is 
hydrophobic (water-repellent), it typically is absorbed by organisms where it works its way up 
the food chain to fish and eventually to humans.19 Moreover, just as “dioxin dissolves poorly in 
water, it does not dissolve well in the blood, and stays there for only a short time…accumulating 
in fatty tissues…” of animals and humans.20 As such, “more than 90% of [dioxin] exposure 
comes from…fish, meat, and poultry…”21 sometimes in concentrations nearly 100,000 times 
higher than that of dioxin found in the environment.22  
  So potent is dioxin that it continues to pose both environmental and human health risks 
decades after its use in Vietnam. An estimated two liters of its residue, for example, remain in 
the customary 208-liter storage barrels after they have been emptied, and even when rinsed up to 
three times, about 20% of the residue still remains.23 Even so-called “low residue” barrels of 
dioxin contain 1.25 mg, an astronomical amount when considering that as little as 85g could 
wipe out an entire city of eight million people (if evenly consumed by all).24 Barrel residue alone 
has led to “inadvertent defoliation of trees and gardens in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Phu 
Cat, and Saigon civilian areas near U.S. Air Force bases that handled the herbicides when the so-
called empty barrels were transported to local merchants for commercial uses.”25  
  Even the process of pumping herbicides into barrels and loading them onto aircraft for 
spraying sprees was risky due to vapors and spillage. The National Institutes of Health has noted, 
                                                 
19 Tran Thi Tuyet-Hanh et al, “Environmental Health Risk Assessment of Dioxin Exposure Through Foods in a 
Dioxin Hot Spot—Bien Hoa City, Vietnam,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 7 
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20 Tran, “Environmental Health Risk Assessment, p. 2398.  
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for example, that at least four major spills occurred within a three-month period from 
December,1969 to March, 1970, consequently releasing a substantial amount of dioxin into 
nearby land and causing “considerable soil, water, mud, and food contamination…at the air base 
and its vicinities.”26  
 Dioxin contamination in the environment frequently becomes a pernicious and virtually 
ongoing process. Dioxin can exist in the soil or be released from burned waste products to bind 
with particles in the atmosphere to shield it from photo-degradation by sun rays. The dioxin in 
turn “stays suspended for a long period of time before settling”, often into nearby land and 
surface-soil.27 As such, the defoliant toxins affected the areas sprayed by the Air Force, and they 
also expanded into and contaminated broader regions of the land.  
  Dr. Wayne Dwernychuk of Hatfield Consultants, a Canadian environmental firm whose 
work in Vietnam was funded by the Ford Foundation, notes that “the loss of a significant 
proportion of southern Vietnam’s forest cover triggered a number of related effects…the loss of 
timber led to reduced sustainability of ecosystems, decreases in the biodiversity of plants and 
animals, poorer soil quality, increased water contamination, heavier flooding and erosion, 
increased leaching of nutrients and reductions in their availability, invasions of less desirable 
plant species…and possible alterations of both macro- and microclimates.”28 So much of the 
vegetation in Vietnam had been destroyed that natural regrowth was not viable. In the deforested 
areas even new seedlings had been annihilated and soil nutrients destroyed which, in turn, 
intensified erosion in the mountains and river beds.29  
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   Before Spraying            After Spraying 
  
                  Source: Agent Orange Record 
 
  Even today the contaminated land continues to harbor low levels of residual dioxin in 
soil, sediment, food and wildlife30 with amounts ranging from 185,000 ppt (parts per trillion) and 
236,000 ppt at the respective Bien Hoa and Phu Cat air bases, and as high as 365,000 ppt at the 
Da Nang air base.31 As mentioned earlier, the standard international limit set by most countries 
cannot exceed “1,000 ppt in soil and 100 ppt in sediments” without requiring “immediate 
remediation.”32 In the case of the Vietnam War, immediate remediation was not an option due to 
the ongoing hostilities, and it was then rendered impossible altogether by the abrupt evacuation 
of the U.S. military, which left behind numerous dioxin-contaminated areas and storage supplies 
when it precipitously fled the country.  
  This historical record establishes that from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, Vietnam 
effectively became a laboratory for a massive experiment on human life. Both Vietnamese and 
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American combatants, as well as millions of civilians, were saturated with one of the most toxic 
chemicals known to humankind, leaving the impact to be revealed decades later.  
Even at the time of their use in Vietnam, the toxicity of Agent Orange and other 
herbicides were quite well-known to the manufacturers. Agent Blue, for example, had been 
determined to be “an arsenical [arsenic compound] that has promoted a variety of cancers in rats; 
Agent White was a mixture of 2, 4-D and Picloram, a proprietary product of Dow Chemical that 
contained a chemical compound known as hexachlorobenzene, a probable human carcinogen; 
and Agent Purple was known to have even higher levels of TCDD (dioxin) than Agent 
Orange.”33  
  Statements made in later class-action lawsuits, including the testimony of chemical 
company officials themselves, reveal that manufacturers were aware of serious adverse health 
consequences associated with dioxin as early as the 1950s, long before the start of the Vietnam 
War. During a subsequent lawsuit by Monsanto workers, for example, the company’s medical 
director, Dr. R. Emmet Kelly, acknowledged that dioxin “is the most toxic compound ever 
experienced. It presumably is toxic by skin contact as well as by inhalation…even trace amounts 
of this (200 ppb) have caused chloracne [skin lesions]...”34  
  It would be decades, however, before independent scientific studies would document the 
potency of this lethal chemical agent. Researchers would find that dioxin binds strongly with 
intracellular receptors in the human body, easily accessing the nuclei of cells where DNA is 
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located. This, in turn, can alter DNA instructions that produce enzymes, hormones and proteins 
and as a result, can cause severe fetal deformities and chronic diseases.35   
A 2009 study by the U.S. Institute of Medicine found “evidence of association between 
exposure to dioxin and five illnesses: soft tissue sarcoma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, chronic 
leukemia, Hodgkin’s disease, and chloracne…[as well as] evidence suggesting an association 
with prostate cancer, multiple myeloma, amyloidosis, Parkinson’s disease, heart disease, 
hypertension, type 2 diabetes, cancer of the larynx and lung, and spina bifida.”36 Professor 
Arnold Schecter of the University of Texas/Dallas notes that “although the health or 
epidemiology research from Vietnam on cancer and birth defects is not considered conclusive by 
Western scientists, it has been shown from other studies that dioxins are toxic and can 
cause...cancer, immune deficiency, nervous system damage including lower IQ and emotional 
problems, endocrine disruption including diabetes, thyroid problems, sex hormone disorders, 
liver damage, reproductive and developmental pathologies, and death from heart attacks in 
highly exposed workers.”37  
  Alongside these documented defects and diseases, other research has pinpointed an 
association between dioxin and birth defects in the children of those exposed during the War. 
Research sponsored by the U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) 
concluded that dioxin exposure in Vietnam was responsible for more than 500,000 birth defects 
in the children of exposed adults.38 Led by Professor Michael Skinner of Washington State 
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University, the NIEHS research team concluded that dioxin exposure imprints changes in the 
patterns of sperm across generations of descendants, such that were dioxin somehow completely 
removed from the environment today, its impact would continue to cause disease and birth 
defects for generations to come.39 
  Considering the long-term effects of herbicide exposure on humans, it does not altogether 
come as a surprise that the rate of birth defects in Vietnam “quadrupled since the War, and that 
most of them occur where Agent Orange was sprayed or stored.”40 Researchers at the Hue 
Medical School in Vietnam found “strikingly high numbers of certain disabilities among children 
in Cam Lo [near one of the U.S. military bases], many of which appear on the U.S. Veterans 
Administration list of congenital disorders in the offspring of female veterans.”41 Similarly, a 
joint study by Vietnamese and Japanese scientists found a high rate of reproductive failure in 
women in two sprayed communities in Cam Lo, as well as highly elevated levels of dioxin in 
breast milk.42 Moreover, Arnold Schecter’s team found elevated levels of dioxin in milk samples, 
as well as in seafood from southern Vietnam where Agent Orange spraying was widespread,43 
and Dr. Jean Grassman of Brooklyn College in New York has noted that “women pass their 
exposure to their children both in utero and through the excretion of dioxin in breast milk.”44  
  Transgenerational effects occur, however, as a long-term consequence of dioxin 
exposure, with much of its impact revealed almost immediately. As estimated 400,000 
Vietnamese, for example, died as a result of direct exposure.45 The Vietnamese Red Cross 
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estimates that “up to three million Vietnamese have suffered health effects from dioxin exposure, 
of whom at least 150,000 are children…”46 As for U.S. troop exposure, the Veterans 
Administration presumes that “any of the 2.8 million U.S. veterans who had ‘boots on the 
ground’ in Vietnam were exposed to dioxin-contaminated herbicides, including Agent 
Orange.”47  
    While evidence continues to mount, researchers now consider the variety of chemical 
defoliants used during the Vietnam War to pose wholly unacceptable risks to human health, both 
then and today. But this knowledge and the consensus regarding their lethal effects was not 
reached quickly, particularly because of debate over the association between Agent Orange 
exposure and adverse health outcomes, and even more so because of lack of actual proof 
regarding causality. Researchers know that victims of dioxin exposure, as a group, experience 
higher rates of birth deformities, for example, but they cannot prove that any one individual case 
is due to dioxin exposure as opposed to something else. 
  With no way for researchers to prove individual or direct causation or what scientists call 
a “dose-response” relationship between dioxin exposure and health outcomes, U.S. policymakers 
simply denied that Agent Orange was the cause of the high number of diseases, deformities and 
health complications, whether they occurred among Vietnamese civilians or returning American 
soldiers. It would take years before sufficient evidence mounted to establish the link between 
Agent Orange exposure and adverse health outcomes. Even when U.S. officials did finally 
acknowledge the impact of exposure on its own troops who had served in Vietnam, they 
continued (and still continue) to ignore the impact that dioxin exposure had (and continues to 
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have) on the families and children of Vietnam. 
 
Birth Deformities Believed to be Related to Agent Orange Exposure (War Remnants Museum, Saigon) 
              
              
          
  The dissonance between what science knew and what U.S. policymakers would accept 
was not unlike today’s politically-motivated denial of global warming. Even as scholarly 
evidence began to mount neither “the U.S. nor the chemical companies involved admitted that 
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deformities and health issues were caused by the spraying of Agent Orange.”48 The extent of 
U.S. denial about possible linkages was reflected in the blind claim of Pete Peterson, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Vietnam and a former Air Force pilot: “Any talk of Agent Orange is propaganda 
designed to extort war reparations.”49  
Despite official denials, sufficient knowledge existed regarding toxic agents to realize 
that humans should not be exposed to them. As early as April, 1970, the U.S. ordered a domestic 
ban on trichlorophenoxyacetic acid “on the basis of its teratogenicity”, including evidence of 
congenital malformations.50 But the ban did not extend to use outside the U.S. as the war effort 
stood paramount in the thinking of those in charge. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt later noted that 
“because the material was to be used on the enemy, none of us were overly concerned.”51  
It was not until U.S. troops began to return from Vietnam, many with a variety of serious 
but unexplained health problems, that attention would turn to the possibility of a link to war-
related chemical exposures. However the U.S. government, primarily through the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs, was having nothing to do with what they 
claimed to be unsubstantiated conjecture. The policy of the federal government was that there 
was no evidence to link Agent Orange to the health status of its returning veterans. This position, 
however, would change as additional evidence mounted. 
In the early 1970s, Congress ordered a joint study by the Department of Defense and the 
National Academy of Sciences to assess the environmental and physiological effects of 
defoliation in Vietnam. Referred to as NAS-1974, the study relied heavily on what were known 
as the HERBS files (based on the term herbicides), an Air Force database of flight path 
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coordinates used for Agent Orange spraying missions conducted between 1965 and 1971. The 
HERBS files contained flight logs of nearly 10,000 U.S. flight missions during the War, detailed 
written records of troop and civilian locations, and information about land and soil 
composition.52 Yet as useful as the HERBS files were in providing detailed information about 
the location and targets of the missions, slight but noticeable inaccuracies in pilot records, 
transcription, and other data led to questions about their accuracy.53  
This was to change, however, through the research of Professor Jeanne Stellman of 
Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health, whose team performed a rigorous and 
comprehensive review of archival data from the U.S. military. While working in collaboration 
with the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records, Stellman’s team re-
examined the HERBS files and, in the process, discovered additional archives that previously 
had been overlooked. The new information included the location and movement of American 
troops in relation to individual Agent Orange flight paths, which enabled the team to calculate 
overlays of precise flight patterns with actual U.S. troop presence in the vicinity of specific 
spraying missions.  
The team thus “transform[ed] the HERBS files from a chronological listing of criss-
crossing flight paths into target-related patterns of flights at different points in time,54 the precise 
ingredients needed to assess exposure risks of U.S. troops. Moreover, in revising their data, the 
team found that the amount of dioxin sprayed within the decade in question was nearly double 
that estimated in the original NAS-1974 study.    
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  The value of Stellman’s research lay not simply in assessing the use of Agent Orange, but 
in identifying the exposure risk of combatants by plotting data onto geographic coordinates, thus 
revealing the location and movement of troops in relation to each separate spraying mission. The 
new maps indicated, for example, “whether individual soldiers or populations were likely to 
[have been] present in a particular zone on the day of the spraying and exposed directly, or 
whether they arrived later and were exposed indirectly.”55 This evidence eventually made it 
possible to establish an association between elevated levels of health adversities among military 
troops (and even Vietnamese civilian populations) who were situated along or near the 
documented spraying paths.  
  As with the number of U.S. veterans exposed to Agent Orange, the number of 
Vietnamese civilians exposed would prove to be significant. A Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) 
was established in the 1960s by U.S. advisors and South Vietnamese counterparts to compare 
census data and population estimates with civilian villagers residing in direct spray paths. The 
information from these studies was made available to Stellman’s team as well. Whatever adverse 
health outcomes U.S. troops on the ground would have experienced from direct exposure to 
Agent Orange, these civilians would likely have experienced as well, and perhaps even more so 
since, unlike soldiers, civilian positions along the flight paths were largely fixed.  
  Stellman’s research provided scientific validity to the health concerns of U.S. veterans by 
establishing links between exposure to dioxin and adverse health outcomes. This information, 
detailed by Stellman in widely-covered Congressional testimony, served as an impetus to finally 
demand U.S. government acknowledgment of the problem. Government denial and inaction was 
no longer politically feasible, particularly given rigorous reactions to the evidence on the part of 
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U.S. veteran groups.56  
  The contributions by Stellman’s team were to be supplemented by other research teams 
investigating the long-term environmental impact of herbicide spraying during the War. Hatfield 
Consultants, the Canadian environmental firm, conducted research to assess the defoliant’s long-
term environmental impact. Hatfield conducted the majority of its research in the Aluoi Valley, 
selected because of its proximity to the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to the demilitarized zone where 
Agent Orange was sprayed extensively, as well as being home to U.S. air bases.57  
 Soil samples collected from the three major U.S. air bases where the herbicides had been 
stored revealed elevated levels of dioxin in comparison to areas of the Aluoi Valley that 
“received only aerial applications of Agent Orange.”58 This realization soon lead to the discovery 
of so-called hotspots, defined as locations “where Agent Orange was stored, loaded onto 
airplanes, frequently sprayed.”59 These hotspots were contaminated land “with TCDD well 
above internationally acceptable levels.”60 
  Hatfield identified 28 hotspots altogether, the majority of which were close to the Da 
Nang, Bien Hoa, and Phu Cat air bases, although the magnitude of Agent Orange sprayed over 
the course of the decade suggests that “there are quite conceivably many more [hotspots]” which 
have yet to be discovered.61  
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 Around the same time that Hatfield conducted its research, Schecter and his team from 
the University of Texas School of Public Health also tested the soil content near former U.S. 
military bases, which resulted in similar findings. The Bien Hoa base outside of Ho Chi Minh 
City (formerly Saigon) revealed particularly high levels of dioxin in soil as well as in nineteen of 
twenty human blood samples from Bien Hoa residents.62 Considering that the World Health 
Organization’s standard limit of dioxin exposure is thousands of times less than what was found, 
these outcomes proved quite significant. Schecter’s team surmised that the elevated levels of 
dioxin likely resulted from the mishandling and spillage of Agent Orange at the southern Bien 
Hoa base in 1970.63  
The Hatfield research found that in more than two dozen locations in Vietnam, Agent 
Orange contamination remains a problem today. These research findings made it clear that 
dioxin storage had left environmental footprints that were identifiable, particularly in former 
U.S. storage facilities at U.S. military bases. The researchers thus concluded “that the pattern of 
dioxin contamination recorded in the Aluoi Valley serves as a model for contamination 
throughout southern Vietnam…and subsequent contamination through the food chain transfer of 
TCDD is expected to be highest in areas of former military installations where significantly 
higher concentrations of TCDD may be residing in soils, particularly as a result of herbicide 
spills.”64  
  After decades of inaction and even denial on the part of U.S. policymakers regarding the 
toxic effects of dioxin exposure on humans, it seemed that science had finally prevailed. During 
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the mid-to-late 1990s discussion began to transpire regarding the ordnance and chemical 
weapons the U.S. had left in Vietnam. President Bill Clinton lifted the U.S. economic and 
diplomatic embargo against Vietnam which soon led to the restoration of diplomatic relations 
between the countries. Soon still other research teams began to arrive in Vietnam to study dioxin 
contamination, and mounting evidence continued to pressure the United States government to do 
more regarding cleanup in Vietnam.  
Not surprisingly, U.S. veterans were the first subjects of government attention. The Agent 
Orange Act of 1991, for example, directed the U.S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assess the 
strength of the evidence for association between exposure to military herbicides and disease in 
veterans and the feasibility of conducting further epidemiological studies and also recommended 
that the Department of Veterans Affairs develop historical reconstruction methods for 
characterizing exposure to herbicides in Vietnam.65  
 In addition to compensation and assistance for U.S. veterans, both the U.S. and 
Vietnamese governments began to explore limited funding for dioxin cleanup projects as well as 
possible compensation for victims of the spraying missions that occurred in prior decades. But 
these responses were tardy, meager, and dragged out over a number of years. In fact, it was not 
the U.S. government that took the lead, but the U.S.-based Ford Foundation.  
In the year 2000, Ford began to fund soil testing in Vietnam to further assess the levels of 
dioxin contamination and to gauge the continuing degree of human exposure. Ford support also 
was directed at public education for Vietnamese victims of both dioxin-related birth defects as 
well as left-behind U.S. cluster bombs. Ford’s initial efforts were augmented in 2009 by a further 
investment to provide health and remedial services to Vietnamese victims.  
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Over a period of more than a decade the Ford Foundation contributed more than $17 
million “to test for and contain dioxin-contaminated soils, develop treatments and support 
centers for Vietnamese who have been exposed, restore landscapes, and educate the U.S. public 
and policymakers.”66 Ford also funded both U.S. and Vietnamese organizations to deliver 
“enhanced services in health, education and employment to children and young adults with 
disabilities, particularly disabilities linked to exposure to dioxin.”67 Perhaps more importantly, 
the public leadership role played by Ford would later spur the involvement of the U.S. 
government, particularly Congress, regarding responsibility for cleanup and remediation 
programs in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the American Red Cross partnered with Ford, contributing 
$1.5 million to begin to assess and track dioxin hotspots in Vietnam.68  
Over time several international bodies, including NGOs and other major U.S. 
foundations, joined in efforts to address the critical problem of dioxin contamination. Among 
others, these included UNICEF, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation and The Atlantic Philanthropies.69 
All of the private efforts notwithstanding, it would take the U.S. government several 
more years to consider and act in helping to remediate the dioxin exposure of millions of 
Vietnamese civilians. Not only was the U.S. response tardy but it also would be tepid. It was not 
until 2007, for example, that the appropriation of funds for Agent Orange and dioxin remediation 
began. Congress allocated $3 million for “remediation of dioxin-contaminated sites in Vietnam, 
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and to support health programs in communities near those sites.”70 Other small allocations would 
follow, guided in part by a bilateral advisory committee of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and a Vietnamese government counterpart, designed to “quicken the pace of action” 
regarding dioxin cleanup.71 The Congressional Research Service notes that “while the 
appropriated funds for environmental remediation generally have been allocated under the State 
Department’s Economic Support Fund account, while the funds for health and disability 
programs have been allocated under the Developmental Assistance Account, the State 
Department has in fact “delegated responsibility for the administration and obligation of the 
appropriated funds to USAID.”72  Of the total $21 million appropriated funds for 2007- 2013, 
USAID allocated 81% for environmental remediation, and 16% for health and disability services. 
The remaining 3% of funds were not allocated by the end of fiscal year 2013.73  
  The irony of U.S. funding for a hasty cleanup, after having ignored any responsibility for 
dioxin contamination in Vietnam for over three decades, was that its steps would be meager. In 
April 2011, Congress approved $18.5 million for the fiscal year, “of which $3 million was 
specifically reserved for health activities.”74 The table below shows Congressional expenditures 
for Agent Orange and dioxin remediation throughout Vietnam from 2007- 2015. Total U.S. 
contributions for this period was $130.3 million, an unjustifiably small amount for so large and 
serious a problem (see Appendix C). 
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While arguably “too little, too late” in nature, it is questionable whether the U.S. would 
have provided any funding at all were it not for the insistence of Senator Patrick Leahy of 
Vermont. Leahy earmarked items in the federal budget to be allocated for Vietnamese people 
with disabilities. Wary of potential criticism that dioxin exposure cannot be determined as the 
cause of any particular person’s disability, Leahy’s language noted that “such assistance [be 
provided] regardless of cause.”75 Over a number of years, U.S. funding, however limited, was 
continually provided under the watchful eye of Leahy. According to USAID, for example, 
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starting “with a program financed by the Leahy War Victims Fund, the U.S. government has 
provided over $60 million in assistance to disabled Vietnamese, regardless of the cause of the 
disability.”76 
  The initial work of the Ford Foundation clearly had implicated the U.S. government in 
the contamination of Vietnam, and in turn had led to “a cooperative cleanup of dioxin in part of 
the Da Nang airport, marking the first time Washington had been involved in cleaning up Agent 
Orange in Vietnam.”77 Rising costs and other unanticipated delays, however, prolonged 
remediation efforts in Da Nang until long after the start of the project in 2009. A 2014 audit 
revealed that projected project costs had risen from $33.7 million to $88 million. Meanwhile, the 
Vietnamese rainy season, which prolonged the excavation of soil and construction of treatment 
areas, led to the shutdown of a secondary treatment facility, and the need to decontaminate more 
soil than originally estimated introduced additional setbacks.78 This effort continued over several 
years, with restoration work at the Da Nang base finally completed in the summer of 2016. The 
U.S. had contributed 3% of the total project cost (see Table 1). 
  A second air base cleanup at Bien Hoa, one of the worst-contaminated sites due to 
herbicide storage during the War, is to be completed by the end of 2017. It is estimated that the 
amount of soil that needs to be removed at Bien Hoa, along with the Da Nang and a site at Phu 
Cat sites, “is enough material to cover a football field nine feet deep.”79  
  Parallel to these cleanup efforts, the U.S. provided a small amount of funding for the 
expansion of disability services as redress for Agent Orange victims, although typically support 
goes not to the victims directly but through Vietnamese organizations. The various forms of 
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support for victim families such as health and rehabilitation services usually depend on the 
recipient organizations. Initially, the majority of funds for health and disability services were 
allocated for programs specifically in Da Nang, a major Agent Orange hotspot, but subsequently 
expanded to cover disability services more broadly “without explicit reference to Agent 
Orange/dioxin hotspots.”80  
  In 2012, USAID approved a three-year Persons with Disability Support Program (PDSP) 
headquartered in Da Nang, and to be implemented jointly by Development Alternative, Inc. 
(DAI) and Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped (VNAH).81  A USAID program summary 
reports that after two years, “nearly $900,000 in grants to 14 local partners and organizations” 
had been awarded.82  
  Meanwhile, the Vietnamese government reportedly has been reluctant to raise concerns 
that the U.S. should be doing substantially more about contamination remediation and victim 
compensation because of concern that pressure could undermine a growing economic 
relationship between the two countries.83 Cooperation is an issue for both Vietnam and the 
United States as each nation seeks to mitigate the growing role of China in the region. But this 
mutual concern aside, the government of Vietnam has limited resources, certainly in comparison 
to the U.S., to clean up environmental toxins and especially to provide victim compensation to 
citizens whose lives have been permanently crippled by dioxin exposure, often inter-
generationally.  
 Vietnam’s contributions to date is an estimated $600 million, including small monthly 
                                                 
80 Martin, “U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance,” p. 9.   
81 Martin, “U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance,” p. 12.  
82 Martin, “U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance,” p. 13.  
83 Black, “The Lethal Legacy.”  
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stipends based on individual health status,84 and on occasion support extends to the provision of 
medical and rehabilitation services.85 The government also has initiated several environmental 
restoration efforts beginning with rebuilding mangrove forests in the Mekong Delta region and in 
Can Gio province near Saigon, efforts designed to mitigate the impact of erosion resulting from 
the removal of dioxin-contaminated soil.86 The Vietnamese government also “conducted some 
mitigation measures to contain the dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa”, such as the excavation of 
a passive landfill in 2009 where contaminated soil was left untreated.87 Such efforts, however, 
are generally limited fixes given their modest size.  
 The combined efforts of the U.S. and Vietnamese governments, particularly in 
comparison to the environmental and human health threats posed by dioxin contamination, pale 
in the face of overall need. In some respects, in fact, problems may be worsening. The Ford 
Foundation notes recent research revealing that dioxin is “moving into surrounding communities 
and up the food chain.”88  
 Clearly the longstanding threat of dioxin exposure in Vietnam will not be meaningfully 
addressed, let alone ameliorated, at the current rate of intervention. And pressure almost certainly 
will be placed on the U.S. to do substantially more. The Aspen Institute, for example, has 
outlined four specific areas in which the U.S. should display greater commitment to address the 
dangers of widespread Agent Orange contamination in the country: 1) Publish a strategic plan to 
become the basis for sustained U.S.-Vietnamese cleanup and remediation work, including 
                                                 
84 Program staff (Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange) in discussion with the author, July 2016; 
Michael F. Martin, “Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange and U.S.-Vietnam Relations,” Congressional Research 
Service, August 29, 2012, accessed July 15, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34761.pdf, p. 27.  
85 Program staff (Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange) in discussion with the author, July 2016.  
86 “Dealing with the Damage,” Agent Orange Record, 2010, accessed June 16, 2016, 
http://www.agentorangerecord.com/impact_on_vietnam/environment/defoliation/P1, p. 1.  
87Martin, “U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance,” p. 14.  
88 Charles. “Agent Orange,” p. 9.  
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prioritizing heavily-sprayed provinces, 2) Design and implement a health and disability program 
in conjunction with Vietnamese NGOs and government agencies; 3) Actively seek other bilateral 
donors to support long-term health and disability programs as well as development assistance 
efforts, and 4) Congressional review of progress and assessment of results regarding its 
appropriations for Agent Orange efforts in Vietnam.89 
 But the key issue that has yet to surface is what the United States might owe to 
Vietnamese civilians whose lives and well-being have been harmed permanently by Agent 
Orange exposure (a potential obligation that could extend as well to those impacted by the tons 
of UXOs dropped by the U.S. on Vietnam). Project RENEW founder Chuck Searcy notes that 
inadequate attention to the plight of families presumed to be suffering from exposure to Agent 
Orange is the biggest weakness of U.S. aid. “The U.S. needs to do more to help but it has never 
developed a truly comprehensive plan to look at appropriate solutions for Vietnamese 
families.”90 The Congressional Research Service suggests that Searcy’s analysis is appropriate, 
noting that the appropriation of funds for health and disability services for victims of Agent 
Orange exposure “has drawn some Congressional attention” but at a very slow pace.91   
 
*        *        * 
 
 The U.S. government has done surprisingly little to address the plight of Vietnamese 
families whose lives have been wantonly disrupted by America’s widespread deployment of 
                                                 
89 Charles Bailey, “Agent Orange in Vietnam 2012,” The Aspen Institute and Agent Orange in Vietnam Program, 
January 28, 2013, accessed July 22, 2016, 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/Agent%20Orange%20in%20Vietnam%202012
%20Report%20-%20EN.pdf, p. 1. 
90 Chuck Searcy (founder of Project RENEW) in discussion with the author, July 2016.  
91 Martin, “U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance,” p. 6. 
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chemical defoliants and unexploded weapons of war. While it has spent some millions of dollars 
in support of former base cleanup, U.S. efforts have been miniscule in the context of its 
substantial destruction of the Vietnamese environment, and particularly the harm to human 
health and lives.  Moreover, the United States has never formally acknowledged responsibility 
for poisoning the environment and villages of Vietnam, nor has it ever considered reparations to 
victims of Agent Orange. In short, nearly five decades after ceasing combat, the United States 
has never seriously confronted its responsibility under international law for the deadly 
destruction it visited on the country and the people of Vietnam. 
 We turn now to an examination of relevant legal standards regarding state accountability 
for redress of grievance related to the exercise and legacy of war. This assessment will include 
international treaties, conventions and protocols, as well as longstanding legal concepts 
embodied in international law that are relevant to consideration of U.S. responsibility. 
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4. U.S. RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TREATY LAW 
 
 
 The question of what, if any, responsibility the United States has with respect to cleanup 
of unexploded ordnance and chemical defoliants left in Vietnam, or for reparations to innocents 
harmed and killed has several components. The ongoing injuries and deaths of bomb victims and 
other harms still being suffered by civilians due to lack of post-war cleanup is a central 
consideration for reasons set forth in the prior chapters. But assessing the legal responsibility for 
cleanup and reparations is intertwined with related considerations: Which weapons the United 
States deployed during the War; where they were used and against which populations; and which 
international standards governed U.S. actions both during and after the conflict. If, for example, 
U.S. weapons were deployed in compliance with international standards, and if their deployment 
was commensurate with the established duty of states to protect civilians during war time, the 
only legal considerations remaining would appear to be those of responsibility for cleanup and 
reparations. But if international legal standards were neither observed nor met—particularly even 
now as U.S. weapons are still harming the people of Vietnam—then the failure to do so could be 
relevant to international treaty standards adopted even post-war. 
 We turn now to a mature body of international treaty law as the context for considering 
these issues. Global standards have existed for decades, some for well over a century, governing 
the conduct of states during war, the use of weapons, the protection of civilian populations, and 
responsibility for the aftermath of conflict. As with any body of law, norms change and precise 
conclusions about treaty provisions are not always clear. At the same time, however, such a 
comprehensive and longstanding legal framework established global standards for state 
obligations and norms of responsibility.  
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We now evaluate four specific treaties relevant to the consideration of U.S. responsibility 
mentioned above. We first examine two treaties pertaining to explosive weapons, followed by 
consideration of two additional treaties governing the use of chemical defoliants such as Agent 
Orange. In the following chapter we will then consider international obligations within the 
broader context of developing customary international law. 
 
CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: 
PROTOCOL V ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (2006) 
 
  The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force in 1983 and 
was ratified by the U.S. in 1995, with the objective of restricting and possibly banning the use of 
certain types of weapons of warfare “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering” to combatants or civilians. The language of the Convention itself is quite general and 
rather brief, but its five protocols include specific and detailed provisions (see Appendix A). 
Most relevant to our consideration is CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, 
reportedly the first multilateral instrument to establish a clear rule that explosive munitions 
“must be cleared once the fighting has ended.”1  
  Protocol V specifically binds States Parties to cleanup responsibilities after the cessation 
of hostilities. Its overall purpose is spelled out in the Introduction which recognizes that injuries 
to civilians typically do not cease when combatant hostilities end, and that states have legal 
responsibility to protect civilians by removing explosive remnants of war. Because the U.S. has 
failed to comply with this provision, we will examine its requirements in greater detail here to 
                                                          
1 Louis Maresca, "A New Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War: The History and Negotiation of Protocol V to 
the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons," Current Issues and Comments, International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 86, No. 856 (December 2004), p. 826.  
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ascertain its relevance. The applicability of U.S. responsibility under Protocol V rests on several 
arguments. Article 1(2) establishes that the Protocol applies to explosive remnants of war “on the 
land…including internal waters of High Contracting Parties,” which effectively covers U.S. use 
of ordnance anywhere in Vietnam. In short, it covers weapons the U.S. deployed (ordnance), and 
where they were deployed (all possible geographical locations). 
  Moreover, the definition of explosive ordnance in Article 2(1)—conventional munitions 
containing explosives, with the exception of mines and booby traps—encompasses the ordnance 
primarily deployed by the U.S. during its decade of combat. The ordnance were various 
explosive bombs and, more rarely, land mines and booby-traps. Furthermore, the UXO that 
remain in Vietnam fit the definition of unexploded ordnance as defined in Article 2(2), namely 
“explosive ordnance that has been…used in armed conflict…may have been fired, dropped, 
launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so.” Including cluster bombs but 
not mines and booby traps in the treaty language, however, may seem subjective if not 
opportunistic on the part of the drafters, and the distinction between them has given rise to 
critiques of the Protocol. Some legal analysts hold that despite an attempted distinction, these 
weapons “cannot be separated from each other on the ground”2 as they all pose similarly harmful 
threats. 
Highly notable is Article 2(5) which defines existing explosive remnants of war as 
“…ordnance that existed prior to the entry into force of Protocol V for the High Contracting 
Party on whose territory it exists,” (emphasis added). This clearly addresses both the time in 
which the U.S. deployed UXO (prior to adoption of the Protocol), as well as their location (the 
territory of Vietnam).   
                                                          
2 Danielle Ressler, “A Primer on Explosive Remnants of War,” Journal of Mine Action, No. 10.1 (2003), accessed 
September 25, 2016, http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/10.1/feature/ressler/ressler.shtml, p. 6. 
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Article 3(1) is clear that when a user of explosive ordnance no longer controls the 
territory after hostilities cease, the user shall “provide where feasible, inter alia, technical, 
financial, material of human resource assistance, bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third 
party…to facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or destruction of such explosive 
remnants of war.” As such, the Article explicitly requires the user of explosive ordnance which 
no longer controls the territory to actively assist in the cleanup and/or destruction of ordnance. 
The significance of this Article is noted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which 
holds that the above language was a “major improvement” from the initial text which “contained 
an obligation for the parties to clear explosive remnants of war in territory under their control, 
but merely ‘to cooperate’ with the other side in clearance of those weapons in other areas.”3 
  Article 4 specifies that the user of explosive ordnance, even if no longer in control of the 
territory, must “facilitate the rapid marking and clearance, removal or destruction of explosive 
remnants of war.” Paragraph two further requires the prior user of explosive ordnance to make 
relevant information available to the new party in control “without delay”. Similar to Article 3, 
Article 4 also requires specific actions on behalf of the user of ordnance to assist with the 
clearance of UXO and to do so promptly. Accordingly, U.S. cleanup responsibility is required 
under relevant articles, for it deployed ordnance that did not explode during the War, and it also 
abandoned UXO upon its departure from Vietnam which thereby continue to be “explosive 
remnants of war.” While the U.S. has never explicitly denied its responsibility under this 
provision, its forty-year silence on the matter may only be interpreted as a refusal to comply. 
  Article 7(1) states that each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and receive 
assistance from other High Contracting Parties in “dealing with the problems posed by existing 
                                                          
3 Maresca, "A New Protocol”, p. 827.  
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explosive remnants of war”, and 7(2) requires respective states to actually provide the assistance. 
This means that Vietnam has the right to seek and receive assistance from the U.S. for cleanup of 
unexploded ordnance, and that the U.S. is required to provide assistance upon request. To date, 
the U.S has yet to provide requisite assistance although it was requested by Vietnamese 
authorities. Critiques of the Protocol hold that although the sharing of information was widely 
supported in the drafting of the Protocol, providing it can be a painstakingly slow process due to 
lack of necessary mechanisms for information sharing.4  
  Relatedly, Protocol V includes a Technical Annex which “contains suggested best 
practice for achieving the objectives contained in Articles 4, 5 and 9 of this Protocol”, and is to 
be “implemented by High Contracting Parties on a voluntary basis.” Article (1)(a)(iv) of the 
Annex states that when a State Party has abandoned explosive ordnance in the course of 
operations, it should “leave abandoned explosive ordnance in a safe and secure manner…” when 
rather abruptly and abandoning its ordnance. This Article contains explicit provisions about post-
war departure procedures and abandonment of ordnance, which suggest that it applies to U.S. 
cleanup responsibility in Vietnam. 
To summarize the foregoing requirements of CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of 
War as they apply to the U.S.: 
1. The Protocol pertains to the types of explosive weapons used by the U.S. in Vietnam, 
2. It pertains to the ordnance that remain unexploded as “remnants” of the War, 
3. Its pertains to the geographical area where the weapons were used, namely Vietnam, 
4. The U.S. was the responsible user party that employed the weapons that remain 
unexploded, 
                                                          
4 Maresca, "A New Protocol”, p. 827.  
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5. The responsible party is required to maintain or leave its remaining explosive 
ordnance in a safe and secure manner,  
6. The responsible party is required to remove its explosive munitions once hostilities 
cease, 
7. The responsible party is to actively engage in all related cleanup activities, and 
8. If the responsible party no longer controls the territory in question, it must rapidly 
facilitate removal and destruction of remaining explosive remnants through 
international cooperation including the sharing of detailed information available. 
 
The United States fulfilled none of the obligations enumerated above, and this failure is 
now an integral part of the international legal and historical record. While the United States has 
never sought to address, let along explain, its lack of adherence to this Protocol, we can evaluate 
pertinent language or search for mitigating factors that might be seen to obviate its burden of 
responsibility.  
First, and perhaps paramount, is that although the U.S. ratified both the CCW and 
Protocol V, neither of them existed at the time of the Vietnam War. It could be argued that the 
lapse of time from the end of the War until the U.S. ratification of the Convention (1995) and 
Protocol V (2009) makes their application to U.S. actions from years prior of questionable 
relevance. The matter of timing illustrates an important consideration in international law, 
namely whether agreements may apply retroactively, in this case requiring the cleanup of left-
behind weapons that occurred prior to the drafting of CCW. It is generally accepted in the field 
of international law that retroactivity does not apply unless explicitly stated and agreed to by 
relevant parties. As to the specific case of Vietnam under Protocol V, “no past weapons treaty 
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has imposed retroactive responsibility on user states to assist with the clearance of failed 
weapons.”5  
Nevertheless, debate over the matter of retroactivity continues with some arguing that 
moving to apply provisions to past conflicts would “provide an important mechanism through 
which states and the users of explosive ordnance in past wars can work to address an existing 
problem.”6 It also happens that addressing the clearance of explosive remnants of war from 
conflicts prior to the adoption of the CCW proved to be a major point of contention during 
negotiations regarding Protocol V. The question of whether the Protocol should address the 
clearance of ordnance already on the ground, or instead apply only to future conflicts, was one of 
the last issues to be resolved.7 Article 7 of the Protocol was finalized to allow for some flexibility 
in applying requirements retroactively on aggressor states, while also seeking to give recourse to 
impacted states.  
But even prior to the Convention, precedent existed in the application of law for holding 
states that committed past violations responsible for remediation. “Several international bodies, 
including the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, have held 
that states can be made responsible for rectifying past actions that cause present harm.”8 
Environmental law, for example, “has established the principal that polluters should clean up 
foreseeable contamination even if it predates the relevant legal instrument...”9 In this regard, Law 
Professor Bonnie Docherty notes that, “basic treaty law allows for the inclusion of such a 
                                                          
5 Bonnie Docherty, "Breaking New Ground: The Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Evolution of 
International Humanitarian Law," Human Rights Quarterly 31, No.4 (2009), p. 953. 
6 Maresca, "A New Protocol”, p. 830.  
7 Katherine Harrison, and Richard Moyes, “Ambiguity in Practice: Benchmarks for the Implementation of CCW 
Protocol V", Land Mine Action. 2009, accessed November 23, 2016, http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/ambiguity-in-practice.pdf, p. 30; Maresca, "A New Protocol”, p. 830.   
8 Docherty, "Breaking New Ground”, p. 954. 
9 Docherty, "Breaking New Ground”, p. 954. 
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provision in weapons treaties… including those that predate a treaty. While a treaty is not 
normally retroactive it can be if different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established.”10 In the case of Protocol V, the intention is clear: to limit or prevent physical harm 
and death. 
With unexploded weapons continuing to cause present harm, the Vietnam War cannot be 
considered simply a past conflict, with the continuing deaths of civilians somehow overlooked 
by the CCW. No logical application of Protocol V—clearly established to protect civilians from 
post-war harm—could be interpreted to mean that it is permissible to let people suffer and die 
even today, because of the technicality that the deadly weapons were dispersed at an earlier time. 
It is in this sense—with Vietnam War deaths continuing more than a decade after establishment 
of relevant international law—that Protocol V can be held to apply now, meaning that the United 
States bears responsibility for cleanup of its weapons left in Vietnam. 
  With the defense of non-retroactivity set aside, another argument that treaty law does not 
place responsibility on the U.S. may be found in various qualifying phrases in the text of the 
Protocol. Some of the language is unclear or seemingly optional such as that assistance for 
clearance of explosive remnants of war should occur "where appropriate" or "as necessary and 
feasible.” Various legal authorities note that the ambiguity of these qualifiers “introduces an 
element of discretion that could weaken the obligations.”11 But to turn responsibility for cleanup 
from mandatory action into a discretionary decision weakens the entire framework, with the 
                                                          
10 Docherty, "Breaking New Ground”, p. 954. (See also International Law Commission, “Draft Articles of 
Responsibility for States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentary,” United Nations Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2, No. 2, Art. 13 (2001)).  
11 “The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force.” In The Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, 
edited by Frauke Lachenmann, and Rudiger Wolfrum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 1070. 
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possible good-will of individual states serving as a case-by-case substitute for legal 
responsibility.  
Moreover, in the years following the War, the U.S. and Vietnam remained hostile actors, 
not in terms of weapons of war but with respect to weapons of ideology. The U.S. may have had 
no meaningful way to assist with the removal of explosive ordnance. Even were the U.S. to bear 
legal responsibility for cleanup of ordnance, it remains an open question whether its military 
records could sufficiently identify the areas where unexploded cluster bombs and other ordnance 
remained.12  
  Additional challenges persist, undermining the efficacy of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons. Similar to issues posed by the abovementioned qualifying phrases, a 
point of contention also arose from the term “superfluous injury” introduced in the Preamble. 
Although Protocol V itself does not include this particular language, the criteria for “superfluous 
injury” was left undefined and ambiguous for some time. It was later resolved by a group of 
doctors who defined the term as injury that causes “permanent disability, disease other than the 
traumas normally caused by explosions or projectiles, virtually inevitable death in the field, a 
very high degree of mortality in hospital settings, or particularly severe injuries.”13 Legal experts 
note that the purpose of establishing such criteria was so “states at the national level and in 
international forums [could] assess the legality of new weapons”, yet they also note that because 
said criteria “has not been validated internationally…it may not be concluded, in the current state 
of law, that a new conventional weapon could be considered prohibited solely because it does not 
                                                          
12 Maresca, "A New Protocol”, p. 827. 
13 Yves Sandoz, “Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 
(Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)”, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 
(Travaux Preparatoires), 2010,, accessed January 15, 2017, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cprccc/cprccc_e.pdf, p. 3.   
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meet those criteria.”14 Just as the qualifying phrases weaken convention provisions, so too, does 
this type of ambiguity. It provides opportunity for states to flout their responsibility for cleanup.  
Perhaps it is reasonable to expect that in a complex body of international law ambiguities 
and differing interpretations are inevitable, in this case for example, leaving the assignment of 
responsibility to be ironed out almost on an ad hoc basis. But the overall import of Protocol V— 
its clear purpose and intent at the time of U.S. ratification—is to limit or prevent the physical 
harm and death of innocent civilians from explosive remnants of war. Perhaps the reason that 
U.S. authorities have never denied responsibility for the cleanup of its left-behind UXO is 
because its culpability is clear.     
We turn now to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a second example of relevant 
international law pertaining to responsibility for the cleanup of ordnance left in Vietnam.  
 
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS (2010) 
 
 The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which the U.S. has never ratified, bans 
altogether the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of certain munitions, and 
“addresses the humanitarian consequences and…harm to civilians caused by [such] 
munitions.”15 The Convention emerged in response to growing concern about the legitimacy and 
impacts of cluster munitions on civilians16, and notes that “…cluster munition remnants kill or 
maim civilians…obstruct economic and social development…impede post-conflict rehabilitation 
                                                          
14 Sandoz, “Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions”, p. 3. 
15 The Convention on Cluster Munitions, accessed on January 18, 2017, http://www.clusterconvention.org/, p. 1.  
16 Lisa Farrah Ho, “Negotiating the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Lessons Learnt,” Singapore Management 
University. Accessed January 15, 2017, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/07/negotiating-the-convention-on-cluster-
munitions-lessons-learnt, p. 2. 
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and reconstruction…[and] can negatively impact national and international peace-building and 
humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many 
years after use.”17 It is to be noted that the call for a ban on cluster munitions arose from the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War18 in which millions of bomblets (small bombs stored in a mother 
lode) were deployed indiscriminately across that country. 
  It may be asked what the relevance of the CCM might be to U.S. post-war responsibility 
since the U.S. has never ratified the Convention, but the failure to put pen to paper does not 
always exempt states from global obligations. A “rogue nation,” for example, refusing to accept 
extant rules of international governance, would not necessarily be considered exempt from 
prohibited or unlawful behaviors simply because it claimed it was not covered by existing 
international treaty law. An international community exists and certain behaviors are expected if 
not demanded.  
  Although states drafted the Convention with notable speed, several debates surfaced 
during the process. Proponents of the Convention reasoned that cluster munitions should be 
banned because they “lend themselves easily to attacks that strike combatants and civilians 
alike”, whereas those in opposition contended that international law already suffices in 
prohibiting indiscriminate attacks, and that cluster munitions are “not incapable of being used 
discriminately.”19 Instead of instituting a total ban, drafters advocated for establishing 
restrictions based on technical reliability criteria “such as a less than 1% failure rate.” The 
counter argument, which eventually prevailed, was that failure rates derived from perfect test 
                                                          
17 The Convention on Cluster Munitions, accessed on January 18, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.47_conv%20cluster%20munitions.pdf, p. 
1. 
18 Sandoz, “Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions”, p. 5. 
19 Kevin Riordan, “Convention on Cluster Munitions”, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law 
(Travaux Preparatoires), accessed February 10, 2017 http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ccm/ccm.html, p. 1. 
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conditions rarely represented the volatile conditions of actual combat.20  
  The United States became one of the countries to opt out of signing the Convention. It 
did not support a blanket ban, maintaining that cluster munitions can produce less collateral 
damage than unitary weapons. It also expressed concern that signing the Convention might 
obviate its ability to cooperate with, or participate in, military and humanitarian relief missions 
because its ships and forces often carried cluster munitions.21 In addition to the U.S., several 
other prominent nations also remain outside of the Convention, including Russia, China, 
Pakistan and Israel. Legal experts note that although cluster munitions clearly have been used by 
non-Party states since the entry into force of the Convention, the stigmatizing effect of doing so 
often results in condemnation from the global community.22  
  While the United States has not signed this convention, several CCM protocols are 
relevant to obligations to clean up its buried ordnance, as will become clear shortly. Moreover, 
since cluster munitions are among the conventional weapons the U.S. deployed extensively 
during the Vietnam War, American weaponry falls under the category now widely outlawed 
under developing international standards.  
  Specific articles, in fact, assign responsibility for the cleanup of cluster munitions. Article 
4(4)(a), for example, applies to cases where cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by a 
State Party prior to entry into force of the Convention for that State Party, and that are located in 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this 
Convention. It requires the responsible State Party to provide various means mentioned therein to 
assist the Latter Party with the marking, clearing, and destruction of remaining munitions. The 
                                                          
20  Riordan, “Convention on Cluster Munitions”, p. 1.  
21 Jeff Abramson, “Treaty Analysis: The Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Arms Control Association, accessed 
January 25, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/CCM, p. 5. 
22  Riordan, “Convention on Cluster Munitions”, p. 2. 
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Article also requires the responsible State Party to assist in providing detailed information about 
the quantity and location of clusters to the State Party now in control of the land. Because of the 
maintenance of detailed U.S. military records during the War, particularly as revealed through 
the research of Dr. Jeanne Stellman discussed previously, there is little doubt but that the U.S. 
has the capacity to provide such information to Vietnam due to the known existence of its 
detailed records.  
Finally, Article 6(6) places direct responsibility on the former States Parties (in this 
instance the United States) to provide “emergency assistance” to the currently affected State 
Party (Vietnam). This Article directly pertains to the situation of the U.S. and Vietnam, where 
cluster munitions have now become explosive remnants after entry into force of the Convention. 
It requires that responsible States Parties, in a position to do so, “urgently provide emergency 
assistance to the affected State Party”, an obligation that would certainly extend to the United 
States, had it signed the Convention. Notwithstanding its clear language, however, Article 6(6) 
includes a qualifying phrase (“in a position to do so”) that diminishes its legal muscle and may 
leave its requirements up for debate.  
  The following arguments may be offered as to why the U.S. bears little or no 
responsibility, at least under the provisions of the CCM. Article 4(4)(a), for example, adds the 
caveat that the state, as described above, is “strongly encouraged to provide” the various kinds of 
cleanup assistance mentioned. An encouragement, no matter how fervently stated, is neither a 
command nor an actual requirement of international law. As such, the United States as the 
former State Party may elect not to respond to such encouragement. 
  Similarly, the U.S. may decline to offer information about the quantities and locations of 
cluster munitions simply by claiming that it either no longer has such records, or that it is too 
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burdensome to research, organize, and share them. Even if such a position were untrue, the 
declaration that it is true leaves little room for pursuing U.S. legal obligations in the matter. 
While there is no evidence the U.S. made such a claim, its forty-year silence on the matter 
suggests that it nevertheless considers itself exempt from cleanup responsibility and related 
obligations.  
   Were the issue of ordnance and U.S. cleanup responsibility brought to light, the U.S. 
could also claim that it offered emergency assistance to the best of its ability as required by 
Article 6(6) or, alternatively, that it was prepared to provide assistance but that the Vietnamese 
government did not respond positively so as to encourage or accept such assistance. All 
evidence, however, indicates that neither offer was ever made.  
  Aside from potential U.S. claims of exemption from the provisions of the CCM, this 
convention—particularly coupled with Protocol V of the CCW addressed earlier—establishes a 
tight and widely accepted standard that states are obligated to clean up their still-live weaponry 
following conflict. In this sense, even if the U.S. has not agreed to refrain from future use of 
cluster munitions, nations are considered responsible for the cleanup of previously-deployed 
weaponry, especially those that continue to kill people today. 
  We may now ask what the relevance of the CCM is to U.S. post-war responsibility since 
the U.S. is not a State Party to the Convention. The U.S. has expressed its recognition of the 
consequences of cluster munitions23 and condemned their use in certain circumstances.24 It has 
otherwise operated in general compliance with the essence of the CCM by notably limiting its 
                                                          
23 Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Cluster Munitions Policy”, on-
the-record briefing, United States State Department, May 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/105111.htm, 
p. 1; Megan Burke, “Growing Global Investment in Cluster Munitions Despite International Bans Against Use.” 
Cluster Munition Coalition, June 2016. https://www.ngoadvisor.net/cluster-munitions-investment, p. 2. 
24 “Cluster Munition Coalition Urges No Use of Cluster Munitions by US and Others in Syria and Iraq,” Cluster 
Munition Coalition, September 2014. http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/media/news/2014/cluster-
munition-coalition-urges-no-use-of-cluster-munitions-by-us-and-others-in-syria-and-iraq.aspx#, p. 1. 
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use of cluster munitions,25 and has restricted its production and trade of such weapons.26 The 
reservations the U.S. has expressed about the Convention have more to do with matters of 
practicality than with substantive lack of commitment to the Convention.  
  It is in this sense that major provisions of the CCM—particularly those regarding the 
responsibility to clean up buried cluster munitions—are relevant to the United States. By 
expressing its general agreement with the CCM, and by purporting to follow many of its key 
provisions, the U.S. has sought public recognition as being in support of the CCM even though it 
has never ratified the Convention as such. Indeed, the U.S. is on record not only as being 
supportive of the CCM, but as being obligated to its clean up provisions.  
  The Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Stephen D. Mull, has noted that “the United 
States is deeply concerned about the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions…it’s an absolute 
moral obligation to clean up—to do everything that you can do to clean up after a conflict to 
make sure that there aren’t innocent victims of weapons that are left lying on the ground.”27 
  Thus, as a matter of stated policy and governmental practice, the United States 
acknowledges responsibility under the key provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
This is, without question, true of its responsibility to clean up its left-behind cluster bombs. But 
the reality is that it has not done so in Vietnam.  
  We now turn from the use and cleanup of explosive ordnance under international treaty 
law to the related matter of America’s widespread spraying of the defoliant Agent Orange and 
the impact of its chemical derivative, deadly dioxin, on Vietnamese civilians. 
 
                                                          
25 Sewell Chan, “Report Finds Ban Hasn’t Halted Use of Cluster Bombs in Syria or Yemen.” 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/middleeast/cluster-bombs-syria-yemen.html?_r=0, p. 2. 
26 Chan, “Report Finds Ban Hasn’t Halted Use of Cluster Bombs in Syria or Yemen”, p. 2.  
27 Mull, United States State Department, p. 1. 
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                *          *       * 
 
 In contrast to international conventions that address the use of weapons and removal of 
unexploded ordnance, fewer pertain to the use and disposal of chemical weapons during and 
after war. Of the conventions listed in the repository of the United Nations Treaty Collection, 
two relatively recent ones pertain to chemical weapons: the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), and 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). Both conventions explicitly prohibit the use 
of chemical weapons, but their relevance to U.S. use of Agent Orange and its possible liability 
for cleanup and removal of dioxin residue largely hinges upon analysis and interpretation of 
relevant provisions.  
 It is important to note, particularly with relevance to the possible application of these 
conventions to the United States, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol stating that, “Whereas the use in 
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, 
has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the world…[and] to the end that this 
prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of International Law, binding alike the 
conscience and the practice of nations… that the High Contractive Parties, so far as they are not 
already Parties to treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition.”28  
                                                          
28 1925 Geneva Protocol: Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other 





 While this Geneva Protocol grew out of World War I, largely in response to the 
widespread use of deadly “mustard gas” on warring troops, it served in many ways as a 
foundational basis for the subsequent treaties that came years later. 
 
 
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES (ENMOD) (1977) 
 
 
 The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) entered into force two years after the U.S. 
left Vietnam, and was ratified by the U.S. in 1980, as one of seventy-seven States Parties. It 
prohibits the engagement with “military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage, or injury to any other State Party.”29 It was established to call attention to the potential 
negative effects that scientific and technological advances can have on human welfare and on the 
environment, and “renounce the use of climate modification techniques for hostile purposes.” 30 
Such concerns had surfaced in the international arena during the early 1970s, in the shadows of 
the Vietnam War and in no small part due to America’s widespread use of the defoliant 
chemical, Agent Orange.31 
   The ENMOD Convention clearly prohibits States Parties from engaging in war-time use 
of environmental modification techniques having a major destructive impact on another State 
                                                          
29 United Nations, “Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques”, accessed February 10, 2017, http://www.un-documents.net/enmod.htm, p. 1. 
30 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques”, https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/enmod, p. 1. 
31 Antoine Bouvier, "Protection of the Natural Environment in Time of Armed Conflict," International Review of the 
Red Cross 285 (1991), accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jmau.htm, p. 1. 
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Party. When determining the application of the ENMOD Convention to the United States’ use of 
Agent Orange in Vietnam and potential responsibility for cleanup of residue, there are two 
considerations of particular relevance: determination of whether the definition of environmental 
modification technique includes the use of Agent Orange, and also whether and how the 
Convention applies to U.S. actions during and after the War. 
 It is often considered by legal scholars that ENMOD does not apply to the use of Agent 
Orange in Vietnam, although the case is by no means closed. U.S. concern about the matter 
began during the treaty negotiation process itself, with the expression of “serious reservations” 
regarding the joint treatment of arms control and the laws of war, reasoning that the combination 
of these two issues might contribute to confusion and impact the treaty’s efficacy. The U.S. 
suggested that a special interagency level review be conducted to address concerns before 
proceeding with negotiations. As a result various policy analysts, including those from the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency who reviewed the U.S. position “found it to be almost 
incomprehensible.” 32  
This caustic observation notwithstanding, the U.S. proceeded to ratify ENMOD, while 
thereafter proclaiming its strongly held position that the Convention did not necessarily prevent 
the use of herbicides in armed conflict. “The United States has, as a matter of national policy, 
renounced the first use of… herbicides with certain limited exceptions…using herbicides in 
armed conflict requires Presidential approval.” The two reservations carved out by the U.S.—
“first use” and “Presidential approval”—were accepted by some of the other States Parties and 
rejected by others. Australia, for instance, noted that, “Environmental modification techniques 
                                                          
32 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs: 199. Memorandum from 
David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 




are prohibited… [such as] defoliant chemicals.”33  Australia went on to note that the use of 
Agent Orange, as applied by the U.S. during the Vietnam War, was now outlawed by ENMOD. 
Commensurate with the position of Australia, the United Nations General Assembly in 
1969 (during the Vietnam War itself) condemned the use of herbicides in Vietnam.34 The 
General Assembly, however, is not a law-making body and is granted only the power to make 
recommendations by the UN Charter. Its position was recognized as relevant only insofar as 
developing customary international law. The role of the U.S. with respect to use of Agent 
Orange, while never tested as such in the Security Council which does have powers to make 
decisions about international law, was litigated in federal court in the United States (2008). 
Plaintiffs alleged that the use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War violated customary 
norms and standards pertaining to poisonous weapons. The U.S. Court of Appeals, however, 
ruled that Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a violation of international law because the use of 
chemical defoliants was not yet a universal norm in the 1960s, and also because the U.S. had 
expressed reservations to the applicability of ENMOD at the time of ratification.35 
To date no court cases and no international bodies have ruled that ENMOD pertains to 
U.S. use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, no relevant parties have 
ruled that U.S. actions were in keeping with either the spirit of the Convention or the direction of 
developing international law. Given the evolving nature of international treaty law, it is 
important to further examine key arguments and developments regarding the possible relevance 
of ENMOD. 
                                                          
33 Australian Defense Headquarters Publication 06.4, 4.11 and 7.17. The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, May 
11, 2006, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule76, p. 1.  
34  “Practice Relating to Rule 76. Herbicides”, International Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule76, p. 1. 
35 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange, et al v. 
Dow Chemical Company, et al, Judgment, February 22, 2001, accessed February 14, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98481.pdf, p. 8. 
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To the first point, Agent Orange does seem to encompass relevant criteria as an 
environmental modification technique: widespread, long-lasting, and severe destruction. Its 
spraying was certainly widespread, blanketing over 4.5 million acres of land; it was long-lasting 
in that spraying continued for an entire decade and its aftermath for decades more; and it clearly 
upset the ecological balance, causing “significant disruption or harm to human life [and] natural 
and economic resources…” such as persistent physical deformities and environmental 
contamination and destruction.36  
  It also is well-established science that dioxin adversely impacts the environment and 
human health as referenced in Article 2. Some twenty years after the entry into force of 
ENMOD, for example, scholars concluded that the use of herbicides can “be equated with 
environmental modification techniques under Article 2 of the Convention.”37    
  Moreover, Article 2 also states that the list of examples therein is not exhaustive [and] 
other phenomena which could result from the use of environmental modification techniques 
could appropriately be included,” suggesting that Agent Orange fits within the definition of an 
environmental modification technique due to its long-term environmental impact. In this vein, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross pointedly notes that “an example of 
[environmental modification techniques] is defoliant chemicals used by militaries to deprive the 
enemy of ground cover or kill food crops”, and that “the United States used Agent Orange during 
the Vietnam War for this purpose...”38 Similarly, the United Nations Environmental Program has 
held that “the ENMOD Convention was established as a reaction to the military tactics employed 
                                                          
36 United States Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: Understandings 
Regarding the Convention: Understandings Relating to Article I, paragraph. C, accessed on February 14, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4783.htm#understandings, p. 1.  
37 Antoine Bouvier, "Recent Studies on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict," International 
Review of the Red Cross, 32, No. 291 (1992), p. 554. 
38  “Practice Relating to Rule 76. Herbicides”, International Committee of the Red Cross, p. 1. 
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by the United States during the Viet Nam War...the Convention was also a reaction to the use of 
large quantities of chemical defoliants...”39 The positions of these various experts and their 
institutional counterparts, coupled with Convention language stating that its list of environmental 
modification is not exhaustive, suggests that the final applications of ENMOD provisions to the 
use of dioxin may not be settled law.  
  Whether the use of Agent Orange and dioxin in Vietnam was legal is but one issue to 
consider. Another key consideration is the application of ENMOD to U.S. responsibility for 
cleanup of Agent Orange residue. Article 5(5) requires “each State Party…to 
provide…assistance…to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that 
such party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.”  
Records indicate that Vietnam did request U.S. assistance with the cleanup of Agent 
Orange, and the U.S. did respond, albeit minimally, to that request.40 But U.S. assistance came 
some thirty-five years after giving dioxin the time to poison Vietnamese soil, contaminate water 
supplies, and harm human health for generations through changes in DNA. Moreover, the 
funding provided by Congress through the U.S. State Department came in meager amounts given 
the scope of the threat faced by the Vietnamese people. And its limited reach was narrowly 




                                                          
39 “Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law,” United 
Nations Environmental Program (2009), http://www.un.org/zh/events/environmentconflictday/pdfs/int_law.pdf, p. 
12. 
40 “Environmental Remediation”, USAID, , accessed February 10, 2017, 
https://www.usaid.gov/vietnam/environmental-remediation, p. 1. 
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CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, 




  The thawing of relations between the U.S. and Russia in the 1980s and 1990s permitted 
the international community to focus not only on nuclear weapons but also on the use and impact 
of chemical weapons. Knowledge and even visual documentation of chemical attacks, 
particularly against civilian populations, elicited outrage from the international community, 
pushing to the forefront the drafting of a new agreement to prohibit the use of such highly toxic 
weapons.41  
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) stemmed in part from the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances, and entered into 
force in 1993, with 192 States Parties including the U.S. ratifying it in 1997. It contains twenty-
four articles which collectively “prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of 
chemical weapons...,”42 with the opening article establishing that “never under any 
circumstances” should States Parties “engage in any military preparations to use chemical 
weapons.”43 The CWC also “provides for assistance to and protection of states attacked or 
threatened with chemical weapons…restrictions on the transfer of certain chemicals to non-
States Parties, and sanctions in response to grave violations of its provisions.”44  
The CWC defines chemical weapons as “toxic chemicals and their precursors, except 
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention…”45 It in turn defines toxic 
                                                          
41 ”Genesis and Historical Development”, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), accessed 
February 10, 2017, https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/genesis-and-historical-development, p. 2. 
42 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article 1.  
43 Ibid, Article 1 (c). 
44 Ibid, Article 10. 
45 Ibid, Article 2 (1)(a). 
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chemicals as, “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals [and] includes all such 
chemicals, regardless of their origin…”46 
  During the drafting of the Convention the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons noted that in order “to address the potential threat posed by chemicals, the CWC 
definition of chemical weapons had to be as comprehensive as possible.”47 This led to the 
inclusion of various classes of named chemicals and chemical compounds in appendices of the 
convention, although Agent Orange and dioxin were unmentioned, either under their chemical 
names or trade names. It could be argued that this omission was intentional, for whatever reason, 
although treaty appendices often are illustrative and not comprehensive. It also could be argued 
that the level of dioxin in Vietnam was indeterminable or variable although it was sprayed in 
quantities exceeding international maximum exposure standards. But because dioxin impairs 
both humans and animals, and is associated with elevated risks of birth defects and adverse 
health outcomes in humans including cancers, and infertility, it is widely accepted as a toxic 
chemical and carcinogen.48 Moreover, neither the United States nor any other nation is on record 
as denying that Agent Orange or its dioxin derivative is covered by the CWC. Given the clarity 
of Convention language, the firm scientific evidence regarding the nature of relevant chemical 
compounds, and the lack of any reservations expressed regarding dioxin, no reasons exist to 
doubt that this chemical is covered by the CWC.  
                                                          
46 Ibid, Article 2 (2). 
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With this established, the Convention further requires that, “Each State Party 
undertake[s] to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, 
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.”49 The CWC goes on to define abandoned 
chemical weapons as “weapons, including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a state after 1 
January 1925, on the territory of another state without the consent of the latter.”50 The definition 
of abandoned chemical weapons is particularly pertinent to the United States’ use of Agent 
Orange because the chemical compound was utilized and abandoned by the U.S. well after the 
year 1925, and it was used and abandoned on the territory of another state (Vietnam) without its 
consent.  
Moreover, the Convention language not only requires the destruction of the chemicals 
themselves, but also the destruction of chemical weapons production and storage facilities 
“constructed or used since 1 January 1946.”51 
   On its face it would be legitimate to ask whether the United States, having left Vietnam 
after the War, having left its chemical weapons and storage facilities in Vietnam, and thereafter 
having a lengthy period of ideological conflict with the government of Vietnam, actually had the 
opportunity to exercise any of its cleanup responsibilities as set forth by the Convention. It is 
arguable perhaps, that from 1975 until the late 1980s continuing hostilities could have limited 
U.S. capacity to do so. But as relations with Vietnam began to improve, and by the time the 
Convention went into effect in 1997, no such rationale could be offered for the failure to reach 
out to Vietnam to fulfill this responsibility. 
                                                          
49 Chemical Weapons Convention, Article 1 (3). 
50 Ibid, Article 2 (6). 
51 Ibid, Article 2 (8). 
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The U.S. did not initiate action on this matter and, in fact, did not discuss cleanup on a 
bilateral basis with the government of Vietnam until more than a decade later. The U.S. also 
failed to recognize other responsibilities it held under yet other treaty articles. Article 3 (1)(b)  
requires that States Parties must declare whether they abandoned chemical weapons production 
facilities and, if so, provide a plan for their destruction. While its abandoned facilities no doubt 
were under the control of Vietnam by the time the CWC went into effect, the U.S. nevertheless 
failed to provide the government of Vietnam with information on the facilities it left behind, to 
suggest a plan of action to destroy them, or to make an offer to provide assistance with their 
destruction.  
The U.S., along with other state signatories, also agreed to take steps to destroy all 
chemical weapons within a particular time frame, starting no later than two years after entry into 
force of the agreement. As with the above matter, this deadline also was ignored by the United 
States for at least a decade.  
The CWC further requires responsible States Parties, in this case the U.S, to meet the 
costs of cleanup, both of the chemicals and their related facilities.52 As noted in Chapter 3, 
although some U.S. funding for cleanup finally was appropriated starting in 2010, it was most 
meager in nature, based on no analysis of overall costs, and dribbled out at the largesse of 
Congress largely based on the determined efforts of U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy. 
To this point, and based on the foregoing Chemical Weapons Convention obligations as 
they apply to the United States: 
                                                          
52 Ibid, Articles 4 (16) and Article 5 (19). 
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1. The CWC bans use of a wide variety of chemical weapons from use by states in 
armed conflict, including Agent Orange and dioxin, (toxins used by the United States 
in Vietnam some years prior to entry into force of the Convention), 
2. States are required to destroy chemical weapons they abandoned on the territory of 
other states, 
3. States are required to destroy abandoned chemical weapons and storage facilities as 
well, 
4. States must declare what they abandoned (types of chemicals weapons, locations and 
amounts), 
5. States must assist in the destruction of chemical weapons and facilities if they no 
longer control the territory where they reside, 
6. States must carry out these responsibilities starting two years after the Convention 
entered into force in 1997, and 
7. States must pay for the costs of the cleanup/destruction of their abandoned chemical 
weapons. 
 
The United States fulfilled few of the legal responsibilities enumerated above. For years  
after the Convention went into effect it took no steps to destroy the chemicals weapons it had 
abandoned in Vietnam, and it did not take steps to destroy its abandoned chemical storage 
facilities (2 and 3 above). It also failed to declare and share information regarding the chemical 
weapons it had abandoned in the country or to offer to assist in the cleanup of sites, including the 
required destruction of chemical weapons and facilities (4 and 5 above). The U.S. also failed to 
meet the timeline set by the Convention (6 above), and treated the support it did provide for 
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cleanup (starting more than three decades after it left Vietnam and years after the CWC itself 
went into force) more as a gesture of limited largesse than a carefully considered and formal 
legal act of international responsibility. And, as will be addressed in the next chapter, even the 
original use of Agent Orange and dioxin in Vietnam, while not violating provisions of the CWC 
at the time because they did not yet exist, violated the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibiting the 
use of chemical weapons under any circumstances, including “asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices [and] bacteriological methods of 
warfare.”53 Moreover, the Geneva Protocol is accepted as a rule of existing international law.54  
 Nevertheless, with the CWC carrying the force of more recent international law, it is 
reasonable to ask if mitigating factors might have prevented the U.S. from complying with its 
provisions. Are their factors for instance that might explain or even justify such noncompliance? 
With the U.S. government virtually silent regarding its duties and responsibilities under the 
CWC as it pertains to Vietnam, the only factor that has even been mentioned in the scholarly 
literature is that of retroactivity. The U.S. left Vietnam in 1973, at which time it abandoned the 
weapons now covered by the Convention, which itself went into effect in 1997. Does the CWC 
then apply only as of 1997, thereby possibly absolving the United States of responsibility under 
the provisions we have considered?  
 On this point the Chemical Weapons Convention is equally clear: relevant provisions 
establish U.S. responsibility retroactively, that is for years even prior to U.S. ratification. As 
noted, the Convention clearly establishes retroactive responsibility extending back as far as 1925. 
Each State Party must undertake to “destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory 
                                                          
53 1925 Geneva Protocol, p. 1. 
54 United Nations GAOR, Res. 2603-A, 24th Session, “Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) 
weapons”, December 16, 1969, p. 9. 
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of another State Party…,”55 including all “chemical weapons, abandoned by a state after 1 
January 1925 on the territory of another state without the consent of the latter.”56 Thus, all States 
Parties to the CWC bear the burden of retroactive responsibility for destroying chemical 
weapons left on the territory of another state, without its permission, dating back to 1925—some 
seventy-two years prior to the CWC Convention itself.  
 The CWC also establishes another retroactive date, pertaining to States Parties’ 
obligations to destroy not only chemical weapons but also their production and storage facilities 
remaining on the territory of another country: “Chemical weapons production facility means any 
equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment that was designed, constructed or 
used at any time since 1 January 1946.”57 
 The clarity of CWC requirements, placing responsibility on states retroactively to 
decades before, was largely ignored by the U.S. When initial cleanup steps were taken, nearly a 
decade after the CWC was adopted, they were initiated not by the U.S. but by the Vietnamese 
government. Moreover, as noted earlier, the tardiness of cleanup activities funded by the U.S. 
was accompanied by treating the limited assistance it provided as a form of largesse or voluntary 
assistance to Vietnam, instead of as a reflection of the clear responsibility it bore under 
international law.  
The notable limitations of the U.S. response, and the unusually casual manner in which it 
was handled, however, represent more than a thumbing of the nose at international law. With no 
systematic and thorough bilateral assessment of dioxin hotspots throughout Vietnam, it is 
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56 Ibid, Article 2 (6). 
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possible that chemical exposures continue to threaten the health and well-being of civilians of 
that nation. 
But the much larger continuing threat is that dioxin exposure due to widespread Agent 
Orange spraying—and so extensively over broad geographical swaths that hundreds of thousands 
and perhaps even millions of civilians were impacted—may still be impacting the gene pool of 
the Vietnamese people. The U.S. Congress itself gave a significant nod to the recognition of the 
threat of dioxin to human health when it established a program of funding and support for its 
own Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to dioxin. The same, however, was never 
considered or done for Vietnamese families who continue to suffer from dioxin exposure. 
In short, the United States has never acknowledged its responsibility for the continuing 
illnesses and deaths among Vietnamese civilians related to Agent Orange exposure, nor has it 
contemplated what, if any, responsibility it bears for reparations to its innocent victims.  
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5. THE U.S. AND CUSTOMARY WORLD STANDARDS 
 
  The international treaties and conventions we have considered, along with many others, 
are part of a broader but related legal framework that dates back several centuries. It is known as 
customary international law (CIL) and, although independent of treaty law, grew out of and is 
based on what states over time commonly accept as shared practices and obligations. Treaties 
and conventions typically pertain to specific expectations and rules of conduct governing issues 
such as the treatment of women, treatment of civilians in war time or of ethnic and religious 
minorities. Customary international law, on the other hand, is more comprehensive in nature. It 
grew out of the application of treaty law and encompasses practices that in some instances are 
considered preemptory international norms from which no state may derogate.  
  As a legally-established international framework, customary international law is 
recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), and by nations and institutions worldwide.1 Not only do both documents recognize 
customary law, they also recognize that upholding it is the key responsibility of the Court, the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations—to “decide in accordance with international law 
[and] apply…international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”2  This 
general practice has two components: a general and consistent practice of states, and a sense of 
obligation that they are bound to the law in question, or opinio juris.3 A practice, therefore, does 
not become a rule of customary law “merely because it is widely followed; it must, in addition, 
                                                          
1 The Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges customary international law in Article 38(1)(b), and 
it is also incorporated into Article 92 of the United Nations Charter. 
2 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(b).  
3 Thomas Buergenthal and Sean D. Murphy, Public International Law in a Nutshell, 5th edition, (St. Paul: West 
Academic Publishing, 2013), p. 28; Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 5.  
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be deemed by states to be obligatory as a matter of law.”4 As such, a rule or principle “reflected 
in the practice or conduct of states must be accepted by states expressly or tacitly, as being 
legally binding on the international plane.”5  
  If instead the practice is followed out of courtesy, or if states believe that they are legally 
free to depart from it at any time, CIL will not be upheld.”6 At the same time, many jurists and 
legal scholars hold that a particular practice “does not have to be universally followed, but must 
nevertheless have obtained widespread acceptance” to be considered customary international 
law.7 
  Even further, some legal scholars hold that CIL is distinguished from treaty law in that it 
is “pervasive enough internationally that countries need not consent to be bound [by it].”8 
Whereas treaty law is binding only to States Parties, “once a norm is established as customary 
international law it is binding on all states…”9 and can be used to fill in gaps or complement 
treaty law.10 In this sense, CIL “expands the reach of the rules to states that have not yet ratified 
[a] treaty”,11 and thus can possess “more jurisprudential power than treaty law.”12 This is 
illustrated by the principle that “the customary international law status of the rules can apply to 
actions of treaty parties that pre-dated the entry into force of the treaty.” (emphasis added).13  
                                                          
4 Buergenthal and Murphy, p. 28. 
5 Ibid, p. 27.  
6 Ibid, p. 28. 
7 Susan Notar, “General Principles of International Law: Customary International Law,” International Judicial 
Monitor, 1, No. 5. (2006), accessed February 17, 2017, 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_1206/generalprinciples.html, p. 1.  
8 Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1984), p. 55; 
International Court of Justice, United Kingdom v. Norway, 1951.   
9 Michael P. Scharf, “Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law,” Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law, Faculty Publications (2014), p. 309.  
10 “Customary International Humanitarian Law,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0, p. 1. 
11 Scharf, “Accelerated Formation,” p. 309.  
12 Ibid, p. 309. 
13 Ibid, 309.  
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 The above notwithstanding, it often is difficult to determine when state practice meets the 
threshold of customary international law.14  If a treaty provision or practice has been followed on 
a widespread basis, and out of a sense of obligation on the part of states, it nevertheless remains 
“difficult to discern how widely-accepted a practice must be to meet the test.”15 
  Customary law has been recognized as a concept central to jurisprudence dating back to 
the mid-seventeenth century. While international law often is considered to have emerged in 
Europe after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, evidence indicates that the practice of customary 
law was not unique to Europe, but instead shared by many cultures—the Near East, Greece, 
Rome, China, Islam, and “Western Christendom”—whose coexistence largely depended upon 
the establishment of shared rules and norms in peace and in war.16 States entered into and 
practiced tacit consent which was “not attached to a contractual view but to tradition, something 
very similar to the present view of custom.”17 In the Middle Ages custom was typically “not a 
defined thing, but rather…an indeterminate set of possible conforming behaviors.”18 But 
ambiguity about the threshold of time required in order for a practice to be considered customary 
has generated debate among jurists which continues today.   
 As the practice of customary law developed over time, its definition and application grew 
more tangible and was reflected in law codified after the World War II. A dominant formulation 
of CIL appears in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This formal recognition of 
customary law was emblematic of other changes of the time, including an increase in the number 
                                                          
14 Farhad Talaie, “The Importance of Custom and the Process of Formation in Modern International Law,” James 
Cook University Law Review (1998), p. 35.  
15 Buergenthal and Murphy, p. 28.  
16 Majid Khadduri, as quoted in Peter Malanczuk’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition (New 
York: Routledge, 1997), p. 9.   
17 Andre da Rocha Ferreira et al. "Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law," International Law 
Commission, Model United Nations Journal, 1 (2013), p. 183. 
18 Ibid, p. 183. 
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of international conventions and treaties.  
  Over the past hundred years or so, three instruments have played a particularly strong 
role in the development of customary international law—The Hague Conventions, The Treaty of 
Versailles, and the Geneva Conventions—because of their treatment of armed conflict and 
because of their contributions to the evolution of both customary and treaty law. They also 
exemplify two of the primary elements of modern international law, namely the rules of conduct 
during armed conflict, and protections for civilians. The former is often referred as to “Hague 
law” and the latter as “Geneva law”, reflecting their geographic origins. 
  The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 govern the use of weapons against civilian 
populations, prohibit the employment of arms which can cause superfluous injury, and prohibit 
attacks on villages that are not defended. They also require the “authority of the legitimate power 
having actually passed into the hands of the occupant”19 to take all steps to re-establish and 
ensure public order and safety. Notably, they also prohibit the suffering or deaths of civilians, 
and introduce two notable requirements: the obligation of belligerent parties to be responsible for 
acts committed by persons in its armed forces, and for the party to pay compensation for any 
violation of the Conventions’ provisions.  
  The relevance and importance of The Hague Conventions regarding the laws of war was 
noted during the Nuremberg Tribunals, namely that “the provisions of the two Conventions on 
land warfare, like most of the substantive provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, are considered as embodying rules of customary international law. As such, they are also 
                                                          
19 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, II), July 29, 1899, Section III, Article 
43. Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp, p. 7. 
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binding on states which are not formally parties to them.”20 The rules of the Conventions 
“undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their 
adoption” and, as early as 1939, they had become “recognized by all civilized nations…as being 
declaratory of the laws and customs of war.”21  
  The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 concluded World War I by instituting an accord between 
Germany and the Allied Powers that established guidelines for continued peace. It required 
Germany to disarm and also to make concessions and pay reparations to certain states. Articles 
231 and 232 required Germany to “accept the responsibility of [her] and her allies for causing the 
loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been 
subjected…,”22 while the latter required Germany to “make compensation for all damage done to 
the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the 
period of the belligerency [including] aggression by land, by sea and from the air…”23 In 
addition to compensatory measures, Germany was also required “to make reimbursement of all 
sums,”24 as determined by the Reparation Commission.  
  It is notable that many legal analysts and human rights observers now consider the Treaty 
to have been an overly-punitive instrument and one that likely led Germany to WWII. At 
minimum the post-war reparations imposed on Germany are no longer the types of reparations 
typically imposed under current international law. While analysts differ regarding the importance 
of the Treaty to the topic of reparations, it is included herein because of its historic importance 
and because it is a major thread in the development of the concept and practice of reparations 
                                                          
20 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907, International Committee of the Red Cross,  
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195, p. 1. 
21 Ibid, p. 1. 
22 Ibid, Article 231 and 232. 
23 Ibid, Article 232. 
24 Treaty of Versailles, Article 232. 
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within the international community. 
  The Geneva Conventions of 1949 came in the aftermath of WWII as an initial step 
towards mitigating the barbarity of war and establishing stronger civilian protections during 
armed conflict. The Conventions, themselves, derived from a diplomatic conference held in 
Geneva to discuss international humanitarian law in the wake of the WW II. Convention IV 
states that civilians shall be treated humanely and protected against threats and acts of violence, 
and it places responsibility on respective warring parties for said treatment. It also prohibits 
States Parties from taking any measure which could cause the suffering or deaths of protected 
persons such as civilians. Additional Protocol I offers similar protections for civilians, altogether 
prohibiting indiscriminate attacks as defined within, and requiring parties to the conflict to 
“avoid locating military objectives near or within densely populated areas.”   
 The historical contributions of these agreements to the development of customary 
international law stand alongside numerous others governing the norms of states. Appendix B 
provides a listing of many of them. In some instances, embodied in the concept of jus cogens, 
customary international law requires states to operate in accordance with global norms that may 
exist independent of individual treaties. With respect to torture, genocide and slavery, for 
example, states may not derogate, and neither can they legally hold that shortcomings of treaties 
absolve them of adherence to these global standards of customary law.25  
  While such jus cogens norms do not cover obligations for post-war cleanup and 
reparations for civilians harmed or killed by ordnance and chemical weapons, we can consider 
whether the U.S. failed to follow customary world standards by using weapons such as cluster 
bombs and Agent Orange, particularly against civilian populations.  
                                                          
25 “Customary International Law,” International Judicial Monitor 1, no. 5 (2006). 
http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_1206/generalprinciples.html, p. 1.  
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  While some might argue that the War is long over and the types of weapons used at the 
time are now irrelevant, such an argument would have to overcome a triple hurdle: 1) If weapons 
used were illegal under customary law at the time of the War, their deployment would have been 
in violation of customary international law irrespective of the passage of time; 2) If weapons 
were used against civilian populations, their deployment would have been in violation of both 
treaty and customary international law; and 3) If U.S. weapons continue to maim and kill 
Vietnamese civilians even today, the argument of their irrelevance due to the passage of time is 
turned on its head, rendering the U.S. currently in violation of customary international law 
because its weapons continue to kill.  
  At the outset of these considerations, it is important to acknowledge that the United 
States itself recognizes the concept and application of customary international law. Among many 
assents to CIL, the U.S. signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, noting that it 
“considers many provisions of the Convention to constitute customary international law on the 
law of treaties”, and recognizes it as binding.26 Moreover, in both diplomatic writings and 
international forums the United States has consistently referenced customary law as an existing 
and binding concept of internal jurisprudence.  
  The international community has condemned the use of chemical weapons for nearly a 
hundred years, and continues to do so even today as we have seen in their use by the Assad 
Regime in Syria. The 1924 Geneva Protocol, as we have seen, held that chemical weapons are 
never to be used “under any circumstances.”  
  This general prohibition, now widely accepted as a shared international norm, is now 
woven into more recent treaty law, notably in the Chemical Weapons Convention discussed in 
                                                          




the previous chapter. Moreover, two resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly 
also elucidate the relevance of CIL in the matter of U.S. responsibility. In 1966, without any 
dissent, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2162B, which called for all states to observe 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol calling for the prohibition of the use of poisonous gases.27 Three years 
later the General Assembly passed another resolution declaring that the prohibition on use of 
chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts, as embodied in the Protocol 
are “generally recognized rules of international law.”28 This prohibition is now “widely accepted 
[and] considered to be customary international law, binding on all states, whether they have 
joined the Protocol or not.”29  
 As for the use of explosive devices in Vietnam, particularly cluster bombs, it is less clear 
that customary international law prohibited their use. It is the nature of war, after all, that a 
variety of explosive devices typically are used by combatants against one another. Cluster 
bombs, however, have been singled out as particularly reprehensible because of their ability to 
kill or maim many people at a time, including innocent civilians. The world community, in large 
part, took a step toward outlawing cluster bombs as an international norm through the adoption 
of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even though the U.S. refused to sign it. Clearly one 
convention alone, particularly a relatively recent one, does not transform a standard into 
customary law.  
 The question remains, however, whether the U.S. or any other nation may feel free to 
ignore developing customary international law. If, for example, the prohibition against cluster 
                                                          
27 The 1925 Geneva Protocol is also referred to by its full name, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
28 Richard A. Falk, The Vietnam War and International Law Volume 4: The Concluding Phase. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 201.  
29 Angela Woodward, “The 1925 Geneva Protocol Goes Digital,” VERTIC Blog, May 17, 2012, 
http://www.vertic.org/pages/posts/the-1925-geneva-protocol-goes-digital-298.php, p. 1. 
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bombs is now accepted by a majority of states worldwide, a prohibition which the U.S. itself 
now accepts in most instances, what then can be the justification for leaving bombs on the soil of 
Vietnam to kill people even today? Is the apparent double standard of professing to accept the 
prohibition on cluster bombs while leaving the same bombs active on the soil of another country 
somehow justified under treaty law or international law? We shall re-visit this issue 
subsequently. 
 We come next to consideration of customary law regarding the use of weapons of war 
against civilian populations. The weight of the evidence solidly suggests that it is prohibited for 
any nation to knowingly wage war against civilians, particularly in the form of injuries and 
deaths. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 addressed the conduct of war including the 
protection of civilians, standards so clear and transformative that they later were incorporated 
into the military codes of various nations including the U.S. Similarly, Hague II further prohibits 
the wounding or killing of civilians, including military attacks against undefended villages. Also, 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 sought to mitigate the barbarity of war by establishing 
protections for civilians from the threat or actual experience of war-related violence. Convention 
provisions include prohibiting indiscriminate attacks and avoiding military objectives from being 
carried out near or within densely populated areas.  
 With the above conventions setting out both widely-held obligations and long-accepted 
international practices to protect civilians during times of war, and with yet other more recent 
conventions and international discourse among nations reflecting the same standards, it can 
hardly be denied that the practice of not harming civilian populations during war time is part of 
customary international law. It in this context that U.S. actions in Vietnam can be evaluated. 
Were civilians impacted? If so, how? And was the impact accidental or minimal, or on a more 
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sustained and broad-scale basis? 
 That many Vietnamese civilians were killed and maimed during the War is uncontested. 
While estimates of the number vary, as indicated by sources cited in Chapters 2 and 3, U.S. 
military records, Vietnamese government records, and those of international sources place the 
numbers in the hundreds of thousands if not millions. One authoritative example of the far-
reaching nature of the impact on civilians was the Stellman Report, based on research conducted 
by Professor Jeanne Stellman of Columbia University. In both her research and Congressional 
testimony, she reported that the number of “silent” victims of the War due to Agent Orange 
exposure alone was 4,800,000, and that this number does not even include the millions poisoned 
later due to the introduction of dioxin into the food chain.30 
 When this impact is combined with the number of civilians maimed or killed by U.S. 
cluster bombs—both during the War and even today—little question exists but that U.S. military 
operations violated standards of customary international law. That the impact on civilians was 
not simply incidental or mistaken is reflected not only in the numbers impacted but also in the 
widespread use of cluster bombs and Agent Orange by the U.S. Some 43% of cultivated land 
was poisoned; 60% of many plantations; and 36% of key forest lands. More than 6,000 square 
kilometers of land in southern Vietnam alone remain unsuitable for agriculture, and their water 
sources were polluted on a massive scale.31  
 In light of U.S. use of weapons prohibited under both treaty law and customary 
international law, and particularly in light of their use against innocent civilians on a widespread 
and sustained basis, what obligations does customary law place on the U.S. with respect to post-
                                                          
30 Jeanne Stellman et al, “The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam.” 
Nature 422 (April 17, 2003), p. 685. 
31 “Public Appeal of International Lawyers Concerning the Responsibility of the United States Toward Vietnam for 
the Sprayings of Agent Orange/Dioxin,” Press release of Initial Endorsers, April 29, 2007, p. 2.    
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war cleanup? More broadly framed, what responsibilities do combatant countries have for 
removing or destroying weapons left on the land of other states, particularly when they constitute 
an ongoing threat to civilian populations? 
 Little question exists but that post-war cleanup is required as a matter of customary 
international law, particularly given the development of treaty law over decades. Moreover, 
recent treaties, notable for their relationship to developing standards of customary law, 
consistently highlight the responsibility of warring parties to clean up the weapons they leave 
behind.32  Cleanup responsibility also has been consistently highlighted in yet other forums, such 
as the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court on Human Rights. 
Moreover, responsibility for post-war cleanup has, as a matter of record, never been contested by 
the United States. In fact, in signing the 1973 Paris Peace Accords ending its involvement in 
Vietnam, the United States declared that it will “contribute to erase the wounds of the War and to 
the post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”33 It would be virtually 
inconceivable to suggest that this commitment, particularly in light of existing treaty laws even 
at the time, would not cover removal of live ordnance and dioxin. 
 With responsibility for cleanup ignored for decades by the United States, and in light of 
its significantly limited and highly tardy response in addressing Agent Orange exposure in 
Vietnam, a final consideration under customary international law concerns U.S. responsibility for 
reparations to innocent civilian victims. 
  Reparations are an established practice to acknowledge the legal obligation of a state or 
entity to “repair the consequence of violations, either because it directly committed them or it 
                                                          
32 Cleanup requirements exist in each of the following conventions: Convention on Environmental Modification 
(1977); Convention on Chemical Weapons (1977); Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (2006); and 
Convention on Custer Munitions (2010).   
33 Paris Peace Accords, Article 21, 1973. 
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failed to prevent them.”34 As such, reparations are considered by some to be “the most direct and 
meaningful way of receiving justice.”35 The practice is recognized in both treaty law and 
customary international law, and is a common practice of states worldwide to make amends for 
wrongdoing. 
  The right to reparations as well as the duty to provide them is a principle of law that has 
existed for centuries.36 It is recognized and secured by the United Nations,37 in myriad human 
rights and humanitarian treaties,38 in legal instruments,39 and also in customary international law. 
It is a principle of customary law that “the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparations in an adequate form”40, and as such, reparations “must, as far as possible, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”41 
  As a responsibility relating to armed conflict, reparations were awarded through the 
Treaty of Versailles in the aftermath of WW I. The Treaty declared Germany liable for 
reparations to the Allied forces as well as for civilian damage caused during the War. Since then, 
the “international concern for civilians harmed by armed conflict has increased substantially,”42 
                                                          
34 “Reparations,” The International Center for Transitional Justice. https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-
justice-issues/reparations, p. 1. 
35 Ibid, p. 1. 
36 “What is Reparation?” REDRESS.www.redress.org/what-is-reparation/what-is-reparation, p. 1. 
37 “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,” United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/remedyandreparation.aspx, p. 1. 
38 Including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2); the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 6); the Convention Against Torture (Article 140); the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 39). 
39 Including resolutions and guidelines adopted by the U.S. General Assembly; The Hague Convention IV 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Article 3); the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 
8); the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Article 91); the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (Articles 75 and 78). 
40 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. V. Pol.), PCIJ, Sr. A. No. at 29. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Andrew Childers and Anna Lamut, “Legal Foundations for ‘Making Amends’ to Civilians Harmed by Armed 
Conflict.” Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (2012), p. 2. 
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with the psychosocial impacts of WW II elucidating the magnitude of violence and also the 
widespread harm to civilian victims. 
  The practice of reparations now extends beyond war damages alone, to include 
compensatory and other measures for individuals and groups for severe human rights 
violations.43 While “most of the international legal developments dealing with civilian harm have 
focused on unlawful activities by warring parties, there are, however, legal precepts and 
increasing state practices that support the development of a comprehensive framework for 
assisting civilians harmed by lawful as well as unlawful conduct during armed conflict.”44 
International law now recognizes several forms of reparations including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation and the guarantee of non-repetition.45 
  The state is the first line of defense in human rights law, with the obligation to respect, 
protect, and fulfill rights46 and, therefore, a state “responsible for violations of international 
humanitarian law is required to make full reparation for the loss or injury caused.”47 So 
preeminent is this notion that it is considered as “a norm of customary international law 
applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”48 
  This norm was manifest in the 1928 ruling of the Chorzow Factory case made by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice – now the International Court of Justice – which stated 
that “it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of the law, that any 
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation…and there is no necessity 
                                                          
43 Pablo De Greiff, The Handbook of Reparations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
44 Childers and Lamut, p. 2. 
45 REDRESS, p. 2; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner p. 5. 
46 The notion of respecting, protecting and fulfilling rights is also referred to as “realizing rights.” Respect (refrain 
from interfering with established rights); protect (prevent against abuses by non-state actors), and fulfill (actively 
safeguard and enforce rights). 
47 “Customary IHL: Role 150. Reparation,” International Committee of the Red Cross,  
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule150.  
48 “Customary IHL: Role 150. Reparation,” International Committee of the Red Cross. 
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for this to be stated in the convention itself,”49 (emphasis added). This ruling indicates that in 
addition to being secured in treaty law, reparations also are recognized as a normative measure – 
in other words an accepted and essential component of customary international law. 
  The actual practice of reparations did not begin with the Treaty of Versailles, nor did it 
end there. The call for reparations include the descendants of individuals enslaved during the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, through the African Repatriation Truth Commission; reparations for 
aboriginal Canadian families placed in church-run schools in an effort to homogenize Canada; 
and reparations for families of the disappeared in Chile under the regime of Agosto Pinochet, in 
which families were awarded monthly pensions, access to a specialized health care program, 
exemption from military service, and educational benefits for children.50 
  The right to reparations is also recognized and practiced by the United States. Forty years 
after the internment of 60,000 Japanese-Americans during WWII, for example, the U.S. 
government provided reparations for survivors including an apology, establishment of a trust 
fund, and the provision of direct monetary payments.51 The U.S. later provided reparations to 
Afghani civilians under the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program for those “negatively impacted 
by the presence of the international military.”52 In 2003, the U.S. also provided reparations 
through the Iraqi War Victims Fund to families who “suffered losses as a result of U.S. military 
                                                          
49 Chorzow Factory Case (cited in The Law I, § 73). See also PCIJ Statute, Article 36, which states that “the States 
Parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all 
legal disputes concerning: … (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
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50 The Islah Reparations Project lists additional examples of reparations initiatives, http://www.reparations.org/why-
reparations/history-of-reparations, p. 1 -3. (See also REDRESS http://www.redress.org/key-cases/key-cases, and the 
International Center for Transitional Justice https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations. p. 
3 - 4.)    
51 Childers and Lamut, p. 3.  
52 Ibid, p. 7. 
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operations.”53 The United States also paid reparations to Switzerland “for the accidental bombing 
of the town of Schaffhausen during World War II”, and in the 1950s it paid financial 
compensation to Japan after conducting an atomic bomb test in the Pacific “which showered a 
Japanese fishing boat and its crew with radiation.54 
  Given this history the United States is familiar with the principle and practice of 
reparations. After some years of averring responsibility for compensation to its own Vietnam 
veterans, the U.S. changed its policy due to Congressional pressure and now provides 
compensation to military personnel who had been exposed to Agent Orange.55 In terms of 
reparations for the ongoing harm inflicted upon Vietnamese civilians, however, no reparations 
have been offered or provided by the United States. 
  It would be most difficult to establish a sustainable legal principle that justifies the U.S. 
government’s decision to provide compensation to its own veterans while never compensating – 
let alone recognizing – the impact of the same harm to innocent Vietnamese civilians. While the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 did distinguish between obligations to one’s own civilians and 
obligations to the enemy, obligations to both are noted. But in the current context Vietnamese 
civilians are not the enemy but civilians, and arguably no different than the Afghani or Iraqi 
civilians to whom the U.S. has provided reparations for damages from its military operations in 
2003. Moreover, the principle of reparations suggests that a state is responsible for providing 
reparations to all of the victims of its transgressions who have suffered in a similar manner. 
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  To summarize, reparations are an established principal of customary international law, 
and the responsibility is of such standing that no need exists even to note it in individual 
conventions.56  It would therefore be in accordance with international standards for the United 
States to provide reparations to Vietnamese civilians for the ongoing harm caused by excessive 
exposure to Agent Orange as well as the continuing explosions of left-behind ordnance. 
*        *        * 
  With the government of the United States largely silent regarding its post-war 
responsibilities, it is difficult to discern whether this long silence is simply a strategic avoidance 
of the issues or if some rationale supports its inaction. It is possible that the U.S. might advance 
two legal arguments to seek to justify the failure to act. One is that relevant treaties governing 
weapons of war and the targeting of civilians did not exist at the time of the Vietnam War, and 
the other is that international obligations governing post-war cleanup and reparations are not 
retroactive in nature and, thus, place no burden on the U.S. to act. 
  Both arguments fail to withstand scrutiny. Long before the United States entered Vietnam 
both treaty law and customary international law banned the use of chemical weapons as 
acceptable agents in times of armed conflict. Moreover, the ban against targeting innocent 
civilians had long been established as an international standard, one clearly existing at the time 
Vietnamese civilians were being targeted on a sustained basis through U.S. deployment of 
explosive and chemical weapons. The weight of international law, in both relevant treaties and 
customary law, does not permit the United States to hold that it somehow made its departure 
from Vietnam just in time to obviate legal responsibility for the types of weapons it used, or for 
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using them against civilian populations.   
 Post-war obligations for cleanup extend back to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, even to the 
obligation of states to destroy their abandoned weapons of war. In addition, the more recent 
Chemical Weapons Convention itself places the burden on states for cleanup retroactive to 1946. 
Moreover, extant treaty law also places responsibility for cleanup on states even if weapons were 
left behind predating the relevant legal instrument, a requirement pertaining not only to chemical 
weapons but to explosive ordnance as well.57 
 It also is an unassailable position to hold that cleanup is a necessary component of any 
weapons ban. For states to be held accountable for abolishing remaining weapons post-war, but 
to then be permitted to let them remain, would undermine the very purpose of cleanup. The 
fundamental reason for post-war cleanup, after all, is to protect civilians who may be harmed or 
even killed by them after hostilities have ended. The logic of this is rendered even more poignant 
when weapons such as cluster bombs and other war weapons continue to kill civilians after 
formal hostilities end. 
 Finally, let us re-visit the argument for reparations to or for Vietnamese civilians maimed 
or killed by the U.S. While the U.S. has ignored the subject altogether, it could not sustain an 
argument for exemption from such responsibility on the basis of timing or retroactivity. The 
concept and practice of reparations arose long before its entry into Vietnam, and reparations are, 
by their very nature, ex post facto.  
 Based on consideration of both treaty law and customary international law, the 
overwhelming evidence is that the United States violated international laws of war by the types 
of weapons it deployed in Vietnam and by their indiscriminate use against civilians. And in the 
                                                          
57 Bonnie Docherty, “Breaking New Ground: The Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Evolution of 
International Humanitarian Law,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 4 (2009), p. 935. 
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forty years following the end of the War, the U.S. has violated all obligations to remove its live 
weapons from Vietnamese soil, or to even consider reparations responsibilities to Vietnamese 
families for those maimed and killed by its actions both during and after the War. 
 
      *         *         * 
 
     “By the mere fact of having sent [its planes to] a foreign country in violation of its territorial 
integrity, and in doing so having caused damage and destruction contrary to Humanitarian Law, 
whatever the modus operandi, constitutes an illegal act by which the United States has made 
itself responsible for the consequences and is obligated to rectify them.” 
Public Appeal of International Lawyers Concerning the Responsibility of the United States toward Vietnam, 




6. RULE OF LAW OR SCOFFLAW 
 
There will be justice in Athens when those who are not injured 
are as outraged as those who are. – Thucydides 
 
  It is now more than four decades since the end of the Vietnam War, soon approaching 
fifty years since the last American troops departed that small Southeast Asian nation. Official 
counts indicate that during the years of U.S. involvement the conflict resulted in the deaths of 
724,000 American and Vietnamese troops, and some 400,000 civilian victims. But the War has 
yet to end for Vietnamese families. The intervening decades have been marked by the injuries 
and deaths of at least 100,000 more Vietnamese children and adults from explosive ordnance left 
behind by U.S. troops. However, this is but one toll. America’s widespread spraying of 
poisonous defoliants on farms, rice paddies, and villages constitutes another component of the 
“continuing war”, particularly for subsequent generations of Vietnamese children. 
 It is perhaps difficult to fathom how a war, once ended, can continue on with grievous 
harm to civilians long after armed conflict is over. We might even ask how a war can be 
considered over when the deaths of innocents continue for decades. Generations back states had 
few perceived remedies by which to address the continuing costs of war, particularly for 
civilians, nor did they readily have meaningful avenues by which to assess and assign 
responsibility for the ongoing harm that resulted. Even well into the twentieth century the world 
had few meaningful ways to address the debilitating impact of war’s aftermath. 
 The situation is not the same today. The world is no longer so lacking in wherewithal or a 
meaningful legal framework by which to evaluate and respond to continuing post-war traumas. 
States now have what previous generations did not have available – a robust body of 
international law that governs the types of weapons used by combatants, the responsibilities 
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states have for post-war cleanup and reparations, and even the assignment of possible criminal 
responsibility to state and military leaders who fail to comply with world standards.  
 The international legal framework extends to each of these circumstances. No longer are 
violations of accepted standards of conduct simply the “tough luck” of civilians who suffer the 
life-threatening brunt of unacceptable behaviors. No longer are nations and citizens of the world 
left without a response other than the feeling of miserable helplessness. A more fully developed 
body of international law exists requiring states to adhere to shared standards of responsibility, 
and placing potential constraints, restrictions and rebuke on those that do not comply.   
 But if the body of international law the world now shares is to have meaningful 
significance in the relationships of states, and particularly in the provision of protections to 
safeguard the lives of citizens, states must honor not only the details of law but the general 
principles of developing humanitarian standards. This is particularly important for large and 
powerful nations such as the United States which claim world leadership, promote enlightened 
approaches to governance, and espouse adherence to the rule of law.  
  It is in this context that we now assess U.S. responsibility for the weapons of war it used 
and left in Vietnam nearly fifty years ago. What does international law require concerning the 
weapons used by the United States? What responsibility does the United States bear for cleaning 
up the weapons it left in Vietnam that continue to threaten the lives of women, men, and 
children? What does the weight of international law suggest regarding U.S. responsibility for the 
lives of the 100,000 Vietnamese civilians maimed or killed since American troops left the 
country, as well as generations of children deformed by DNA alterations passed down from their 
parents and grandparents who suffered Agent Orange exposure? And finally, what external 
pressures and entities can help to fortify the enforcement of international law?  
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  Consideration of relevant international conventions in the foregoing chapters, nested 
within the framework of customary international law, support the conclusion that the United 
States: 
1) Used military weapons in Vietnam that had been outlawed decades earlier, 
particularly the use of poisonous chemical agents,  
2) Employed weapons in Vietnam, including cluster bombs and Agent Orange, that are  
clearly illegal under existing international standards, 
3) Used both chemicals and cluster bombs on a widespread basis against innocent 
civilians,  
4) Has never officially acknowledged that its weapons are still maiming and killing 
Vietnamese and, thus, that its war-related hostilities continue even today,  
5) Has failed altogether to accept or even discuss responsibility for cleanup of the 
unexploded ordnance it left on Vietnamese soil, and 
6) Has never addressed or even considered any responsibility for reparations to 
Vietnamese civilians killed by left-behind live ordnance or poisoned by Agent 
Orange, even though it has acknowledged the impact of this poisonous chemical on 
its own troops through stipends now awarded to U.S. veterans. 
Given the relevance of current international law to the role of the U.S. during the 
Vietnam War, how can U.S. failure to acknowledge, let alone meaningfully consider, 
responsibility under relevant conventions and treaties be understood? Perhaps the only way to 
truly understand U.S. failure to address post-war responsibility is to conclude that the United 
States considers international law more an elective than an obligation. The American 
government, like some other nations, not infrequently has viewed treaty provisions to which it is 
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bound less as mandatory legal obligations and more as expectations from which it is free to 
exempt itself. On some occasions it has refused even the expansion of international law. Today, 
for example, the United States has not agreed to the complete ban of cluster bombs. Along with 
Russia, Pakistan, China, and Israel, the U.S. has refused to join the 100+ nations who now hold 
cluster bombing to be an inhumane and unacceptable practice. Because the American 
government exempts itself from this generally-accepted international standard, does it mean that 
it is legally exempt and thus has an absolute right to employ cluster bombs against other nations? 
Does it mean that the U.S. is permitted to disregard international standards when it simply elects 
to do so? And if the answer to either or both questions is in the affirmative, what does this 
suggest about America’s claim to world leadership and its avowed respect for the rule of law?  
  By awarding itself special privilege, the U.S. enjoys the luxury of benefitting from 
conflicting options: seeking acceptance and recognition as a world leader among the 
international community, while reserving for itself the wiggle-room to ignore established legal 
norms when deemed convenient. By failing to recognize and comply with some treaties, by 
circumscribing key elements of treaties it does recognize, and by quibbling over the 
interpretative language of still others, the U.S. government often undermines its standing as a 
strong world leader. With respect to its responsibilities to Vietnam, the inaction of the U.S. 
indicates that it does not always take seriously its international treaty obligations and the 
developing norms of customary law.  
   Perhaps the U.S. has refused to carry out its legal responsibilities to Vietnam because it 
could hardly sustain an argument that it is unaware of the ordnance and chemicals it left behind. 
Likewise, neither could the U.S. claim that it is unaware of the continuing deaths it is still 
causing among the civilian population of Vietnam. Because this knowledge is part of the 
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international public record, such arguments would be considered fanciful at best. Neither could 
the U.S. sustain a logical argument that it lacks responsibility due to the thin thread of timing, 
namely that some relevant treaties which apply now were not in force at the time of the War. 
Such a position would be a fool’s errand since America’s unexploded weapons are still at work 
today, making any and all of these existing treaty provisions relevant today, irrespective of their 
dates of adoption. Whatever weapons and uses may not have been illegal under international law 
at the time of the Vietnam War are illegal now, because the U.S. is allowing them to kill 
Vietnamese people today.  
  The weight of the evidence—the array of multiple conventions established and employed 
over decades, the practices of relevant state and international institutions, and the practice of 
customary international law—suggests that regardless of any ambiguity in particular treaty 
provisions, it is in both the spirit and trajectory of developing international law for the U.S. to 
facilitate the removal and destruction of explosive remnants of war in Vietnam, to make the 
country and its people safe from dioxin poisoning related to Agent Orange, and to provide 
appropriate reparations for victims and families harmed inter-generationally by the U.S. spraying 
of poisonous chemicals on their forests, fields and rivers.   
  Having no logical or meaningful reprieve from responsibility under international law, the 
United States appears to have several options. First, the U.S. could simply continue to ignore its 
responsibilities regarding Vietnam. Such inaction—a let-sleeping-dogs-lie approach—would 
seemingly free the U.S. from addressing such thorny issues and possibly bring it financial 
benefits by ignoring them altogether. On the other hand, continued U.S. silence could also 
weaken the efficacy of international law, undermine U.S. claims to world leadership with respect 




  A second option would be for the U.S. to formally acknowledge the compelling issues of 
explosive ordnance and Agent Orange exposure, including the obligation to initiate cleanup and 
reparations, by working with the Vietnamese government to remove and destroy ordnance and 
by proposing further Congressional funding for cleanup of all toxic hotspots. This would mean, 
of course, that the American government would have to discontinue the position that it owes 
compensation to its own veterans for exposing them to Agent Orange while ignoring any 
responsibility for innocent Vietnamese people who it poisoned. 
  A third option would be for relevant Congressional committees to hold hearings to better 
understand the nature and dimensions of the problem of left-behind ordnance, to help educate the 
public about it as well, and to consider appropriate steps to take under international law. Such 
hearings could be conducted in one of two ways: an investigative matter to scrutinize 
responsibility of the U.S. government, or legislative hearings to formulate steps to fully exercise 
responsibility for cleanup and reparations.     
  Yet a final option is that the international community itself, possibly through the United 
Nations or even a quasi-independent, multilateral international body, could investigate U.S. 
conduct under existing law, and point to areas of responsibility that never have been recognized 
by the U.S. 
   As is evident with the case of the U.S. in Vietnam, increasing state compliance with 
obligations under international law requires much more than the goodwill and the legal 
commitments of states. Pressure from the international community by way of global institutions, 
non-governmental organizations and other nations, in combination, are required to advance 
compliance. The international community must apply the same bold integrity to compel 
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compliance with obligations of post-war cleanup and reparations as is applied to other laws of 
war. 
        *         *         * 
  Formal United States participation in the Vietnam War ended when its troops departed 
the country in the early 1970s, but the War has yet to end. Deaths continue to accrue from 
ordnance explosions and from congenital diseases associated with Agent Orange exposure. They 
will continue to mount indefinitely unless the United States takes action through one of the 
abovementioned means.  
  Little else seems to exemplify the gravity of continued post-war suffering as much as the 
fact that it is not unique to Vietnam, but also impacts nations across the globe. Continuing post-
war violence is not limited to any particular country or global region, but is an outcome 
experienced by many who have participated in war. According to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, ordnance remain in other post-conflict regions including Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Iraq, Rwanda, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka, among others. If the United States were to take 
meaningful and appropriate steps in Vietnam it could open the door for the accountability of 
other states for removing explosive remnants of other wars. Yet much remains contingent upon 
the U.S. formally recognizing and accepting responsibility.  
  With respect to Vietnam, America has two options: to demonstrate respect for the rule of 








Four International Conventions Covered in Chapters 2 and 3 
 
 
1. CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES (ENMOD) (1977) 
 




Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of halting 
the arms race, and of bringing about general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of 
warfare, 
 
Determined to continue negotiations with a view to achieving effective progress toward further 
measures in the field of disarmament, 
 
Recognizing, however, that military or any other hostile use of such techniques could have 
effects extremely harmful to human welfare, 
 
Desiring to prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use, and affirming their 
willingness to work towards the achievement of this objective, 
 
Article 1 (1) - Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.  
 
Article 2 - As used in article I, the term environmental modification techniques refers to any 
technique for changing - through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere 
and atmosphere, or of outer space.  
 
Article 5 (5) - Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which 
so requests, if the Security Council decides that such party has been harmed or is likely to be 
harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.  
 
Understandings regarding the Convention - It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the 
purposes of this Convention, the terms "widespread", "long-lasting" and "severe" shall be 




a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers 
b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season 
c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and 





2. CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, 
STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION 
(CWC) (1997) 
 
The following articles were selected by the author for bearing greatest relevance to post-war cleanup and reparations 
responsibilities. 
 
Article 1 (1) (c) - Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances 
to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.  
 
Article 1 (2) - Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or 
that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention.  
 
Article 1 (3) - Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the 
territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.  
 
Article 1 (4) - Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities 
it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.  
 
Article 2 (1) (a) - "Chemical weapons" means toxic chemicals and their precursors, except 
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes 
 
Article 2 (2) - "Toxic Chemical" means any chemical which through its chemical action on life 
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. 
This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and 
regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.  
 
Article 2 (6) - "Abandoned Chemical Weapons" means chemical weapons, including old 
chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State 
without the consent of the latter. 
 
Article 2 (8) (a) - "Chemical Weapons Production Facility" means any equipment, as well as any 
building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any time since 1 
January 1946 
 
Article 3 (1) (b) - With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons:  
 
(iii) Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of other States and 





Article 3 (1) (c) (v) – With respect to chemical weapons production facilities: Provide its general 
plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 6, of 
the Verification Annex  
 
Article 3 (1) (c) (vi) - With respect to chemical weapons production facilities: Specify actions to 
be taken for closure of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1 
(i), of the Verification Annex  
 
Article 4 (6) - Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 
pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of 
destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of destruction"). Such destruction shall begin not 
later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later than 
10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying 
such chemical weapons at a faster rate. 
 
Article 4 (7) - Each State Party shall:  
 
(a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not 
later than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins, in accordance with Part IV (A), 
paragraph 29, of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be 
destroyed during the next annual destruction period 
 
(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of 
chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1, not later than 60 days after the end of each annual 
destruction period 
 
(c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all 
chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed 
 
Article 4 (11) - Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons that are owned or 
possessed by another State, or that are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that these chemical weapons are removed 
from its territory not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it. If they are 
not removed within one year, the State Party may request the Organization and other States 
Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.  
 
Article 4 (12) - Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Parties that request 
information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding 
methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons. 
 
Article 4 (16) - Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is 
obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these 
chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council 
decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 13, the costs of 
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complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7. 
 
Article 10 (8) (a) - Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures set 
forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat 





3. CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS:  
PROTOCOL V ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (2006) 
 




[It is noted that] the High Contracting Parties, recognizing the serious post-conflict 
humanitarian problems caused by explosive remnants of war [and] conscious of the need to 
conclude a Protocol on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to minimize 
the risks and effects of explosive remnants of war…have agreed as follows…” 
 
Article 1 (2) - This Protocol shall apply to explosive remnants of war on the land territory 
including internal waters of High Contracting Parties.  
 
Article 2 (1) - Explosive ordnance means conventional munitions containing explosives, with the 
exception of mines, booby traps and other devices as defined in Protocol II of this Convention as 
amended on 3 May 1996. 
Article 2 (2) - Unexploded ordnance means explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, 
armed, or otherwise prepared for use and used in an armed conflict. It may have been fired, 
dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so.  
 
Article 2 (5) - Existing explosive remnants of war means unexploded ordnance and abandoned 
explosive ordnance that existed prior to the entry into force of this Protocol for the [High 
Contracting Party on whose territory it exists].  
 
Article 3 (1) - Each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict shall bear the 
responsibilities set out in this Article with respect to all explosive remnants of war in territory 
under its control. In cases where a user of explosive ordnance which has become explosive 
remnants of war, does not exercise control of the territory, the user shall, after the cessation of 
active hostilities, provide…inter alia technical, financial, material or human resources 
assistance…to facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or destruction of such explosive 
remnants of war. [Article 8(1) also obliges States Parties to “provide assistance for the marking 
and clearance, removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war.”]  
 
Article 3 (4) - In conducting the above activities High Contracting Parties and parties to an 
armed conflict shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine 
Action Standards. [Article 7(2) also obliges States Parties to “take into account the 
humanitarian objectives of this Protocol, as well as international standards…”]. 
 
Article 4 (1) - High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict shall to the maximum 
extent possible and as far as practicable record and retain information on the use of explosive 
ordnance or abandonment of explosive ordnance, to facilitate the rapid marking and clearance, 
removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war, risk education and the provision of relevant 




Article 4 (2) - High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict which have used or 
abandoned explosive ordnance which may have become explosive remnants of war shall, without 
delay after the cessation of active hostilities and as far as practicable, subject to these parties’ 
legitimate security interests, make available such information to the party or parties in control of 
the affected area, bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party including inter alia the 
United Nations or, upon request, to other relevant organizations which the party providing the 
information is satisfied are or will be undertaking risk education and the marking and clearance, 
removal or destruction of explosive remnants of war in the affected area. 
 
Article 7 (1) - Each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where 
appropriate, from other High Contracting Parties, from states non-party and relevant 
international organizations and institutions in dealing with the problems posed by existing 






4. CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS (2010)  
 
 




Article 2 (2) - Cluster munition means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or 
release explosive sub-munitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those 
explosive sub-munitions. 
 
Article 4 (2) (d) – [Each State Party shall]… clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants 
located in areas under its jurisdiction or control. 
 
Article 4 (4) (a) - This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used 
or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party 
and have become cluster munition remnants that are now located in areas under the jurisdiction 
or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter. 
In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State 
Party is strongly encouraged to provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human 
resources assistance to the latter State Party…to facilitate the marking, clearance and 
destruction of such cluster munition remnants. 
 
Article 4 (4) (b) – Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and 
quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes, and ones in 
which cluster munitions are known to be located. 
 
Article 6 (3) - …The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and 
receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for 
humanitarian purposes. 
 
Article 6 (6) - Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become 
cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, 
each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the 
affected State Party.  
 
Article 21 (1) - Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, 
accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all 





Major International Instruments Governing Armed Conflict and Post-War Obligations 
 
This compilation of treaties, conventions, and world institutions were selected for their relevance to armed conflict, 
including conduct during war, protections for civilian populations, and obligations of States Parties for cleanup and 
reparation. Given the breadth of international law, this list is exemplary, not exhaustive.  
 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (1863) – The world’s largest humanitarian organization, 
and the driving force behind the development of international humanitarian law. It oversees and 
ensures humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other violence. 
 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 – Multilateral treaties that were among the first formal 
statements of the laws of war, war crimes, and disarmament. This included a voluntary international 
court for compulsory arbitration to settle international disputes; identifying conditions for the 
belligerency of war; and establishing the rights and obligations of persons in war. 
 
Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919) – The treaty which effectively ended the First World War. It required 
"Germany [to] accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" 
during the war, including forcing Germany to disarm, make substantial territorial concessions, and pay 
reparations. 
 
The League of Nations (1920) - the first international organization established to maintain world peace 
through collective security and disarmament; settling international disputes through negotiation and 
arbitration. Other issues in this and related treaties included labor conditions, just treatment of native 
inhabitants, human and drug trafficking, the arms trade, global health, prisoners of war, and protection 
of minorities in Europe. 
 
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 (Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare) – A treaty drawing upon the 
language of The Peace Treaty of Versailles to prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons in 
international armed conflicts. 
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Charter of the United Nations (1945) – The founding treaty of the United Nations, of which the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice is an integral part. The Charter was created in the wake of war to 
reaffirm the global commitment to human rights, and states in the Preamble that unless in the common 
interest, the use of force shall not be used. 
 
International Court of Justice (1945) – The ICJ was established in 1945 by the UN Charter. It is the 
primary judicial branch of the United Nations; all state members of the United Nations are 
automatically parties to the Court's statute. It decides, in accordance with international law, disputes of 
a legal nature that are submitted to it by States. 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 – The Conventions establish the conduct of states in armed conflict and 
protections for civilians. Addressed in foregoing chapters.  
 
European Court of Justice (1959) – The highest court in the European Union in matters of European 
Union law. As a part of the Court of Justice of the European Union it is tasked with interpreting EU 
law and ensuring its equal application across all EU member states. 
ENMOD Convention (1977) – Addressed in foregoing chapters. 
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979) – The Court enforces and interprets the provisions of 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Its two main functions are adjudicatory and advisory; 
under the former, it hears and rules on the specific cases of human rights violations referred to it. 
 
Convention on Conventional Weapons (1983) – Addressed in foregoing chapters. 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993) - An ad hoc court in The 
Hague that prosecutes serious crimes committed during the Yugoslav Wars, and to try their 
perpetrators.  
 
Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) – Addressed in foregoing chapters. 
 
International Criminal Court (1998) – The ICC is a treaty court established to prosecute individuals 




African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (2004) – The Court ensures respect for and compliance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as other international human rights 
instruments, through judicial decisions. 
Protocol V of Chemical Weapons Convention (2006) – Addressed in foregoing chapters. 
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